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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (19 Nov 68) FOR OT RD 683262

25 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.
3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

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Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. (C) Introduction.

(1) The 1st Infantry Division, during this period, continued the combined offensive Operation TOAN THANG (Complete Victory) with increased pressure being maintained on VC/NVA efforts to reorganize and resupply in base camps along the periphery of the 1st Infantry Division Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) in northeast and northwest Binh Duong Province. Extensive land clearing was accomplished, primarily along the Binh Duong and Binh Long Province boundary into the Michelin Rubber Plantation and along Highway 16 north of Tan Uyen. Route security operations continued along Highway 13 to QUAN LOI with daily convoy traffic maintained. Overwatch of US Special Forces activities, Vietnamese Governmental installations, and ARVN activities in the Division's TAOI continues.

(2) Base Camp activities continued at the four division base camps located at DI AN, PHU LOI, LAI KHE and QUAN LOI. Base camps were subjected to VC/NVA attacks by fire to a lesser degree than during the previous reporting period with LAI KHE being the most frequently targeted base camp.

(3) On 12 June, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (minus one squadron) became OPCON to the division and remains in that status at the close of this reporting period.

b. (C) Personnel and Administration.

(1) Personnel:

(a) Strength	OFF	WO	EM	AGG
Authorized 1 May 68	1070	177	15858	17105
Authorized 31 Jul 68	1047	174	15408	16629
Assigned 1 May 68	1096	167	16528	17791
Assigned 31 Jul 68	1002	170	16015	17187

(b) Gains, qualifications and status

1. Enlisted:

a. Replacements received: 4845.

b. Outstanding requisitions: Sr Enl Grades: 05B4P (1), 05C40 (1), 11B40 (12), 11C40 (6), 31Z50 (1), 11D40 (2), 11F40 (5), 11G50 (8), 11F50 (2), 12B40 (4), 12Z50 (2), 13B40 (1), 13Z50 (6), 63C40 (3), 63Z50 (4), 67M40 (1), 67Z50 (2), 71H40 (3), 71L40 (1), 71L50 (1), 73Z50 (1), 76J40 (1), 76Y40 (3), 82C40 (1), 91B40 (1), 91Z50 (1), 94B40 (15), 95B40 (1), 97B40 (1). E6 and below: During the quarter, emergency requisitions were submitted for 301 personnel due to shortfalls in fill of normal monthly

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Inclosure 1

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AVDB-E (1500)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968, HCS CGMOR-65 (R1), (U)

requisitions (May - 234, Jun - 17, Jul - 50). Lead time on such requisitions is 60 days. In July, 89 of the 234 requisitioned in May were received.

c. Credits: None

d. Qualifications: None

e. Status: Same

2. Officer:

a. Replacements received 521

b. Outstanding requisitions: 5

c. Credits: ample replacements were received for losses, however, a shortage of Captains still exist in combat arms particularly Infantry.

d. Qualifications and status: Lieutenant fill being received for requested Captain requirements, particularly in combat arms Infantry and Artillery.

(c) Losses:

(a) Detailed: There were 4252 losses during the quarter due to reassignment within Vietnam, rotations, LRS, and board action.

() Officer: There were 488 losses during the quarter due to reassignment within Vietnam, rotations, LRS, and board action.

(4) Losses due to casualties were as follows:

(a) Day:	OFF	JO	1	REG
KH.	3	1	87	91
MI.	36	4	451	491
MD	0	0	3	3
ME	1	0	41	42

(b) Jun:	OFF	JO	1	REG
KH.	9	0	55	64
MI.	34	0	349	383
MD	0	0	3	3
ME	0	0	36	36

(c) Jul:	OFF	JO	1	REG
KH.	3	0	27	30
MI.	13	0	199	212
MD	4	0	4	8
ME	2	0	42	44

(2) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) During the past quarter there were 10 stragglers apprehended. There were 34 serious incidents and 26 AOLS reported to the PI during the period and 10 apprehended.

(b) There was 16 General Courts-Martial trial during the quarter. A total of 61 records of trial for Special Courts-Martial and 16 records of trial for Summary Courts-Martial were received for review.

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AVM-T (HND)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RUS CSFOR-65 (RI), (U)

(3) Graves Registration: During the quarter there were 159 remains processed and evacuated.

(4) Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(a) Chaplain: During the quarter there were 1932 religious services conducted with a total attendance of 59,193.

(1) During the quarter 4466 out-of-country R&I allocations were utilized.

(c) Awards and Decorations:

Medal of Honor	0
Distinguished Service Cross	3
Distinguished Service Medal	0
Legion of Merit	20
Silver Star	145
Distinguished Flying Cross	69
Soldier's Medal	19
Air Medal Valor	50
Air Medal Merit	1571
Bronze Star Valor	476
Bronze Star Merit	2381
Army Commendation Medal Valor	305
Army Commendation Medal Merit	3360
Purple Heart	772
Certificate of Achievement	0
TOTAL	9171

(5) Civilian Personnel:

(a) As of the end of the quarter the Division employed 1050 daily hire local nationals.

(b) There were 721 permanent hire local nationals employed at the end of the quarter.

c. (C) Operations.

(1) General: Phase I, Operation RUM THUC (Complete Victory) initiated 060001 April, with all organic and attached units, continued into this reporting period terminating 312400 May. Phase II followed and continues as this report period ends. From 1 April to 24 April VC/VA forces avoided contact and remained generally in a defensive posture. However, a limited number of major units continued to conduct protracted limited objective operations in the vicinity of Saigon. Other major units withdrew from the Saigon area into base areas in northeast and northwest Binh Duong Province in order to receive replacements and resupply in preparation for the second general offensive which commenced on 25 April and continued until approximately 5 June. Although Division operations in VC/VA sanctuaries in late March through April deprived VC/VA forces of large quantities of supplies and equipment and in deference to extensive reconnaissance in force operations and ambush patrols in the L&L area, large VC/VA forces were again able to penetrate deeply into the L&L S&L/Saigon area to conduct ground attacks and attacks by fire against critical installations. Numerous attacks by fire were initiated against Saigon with 107mm and 120mm rockets. The four 1st Infantry Division base camps received attacks by fire with L&L NH Base Camp being hit 17 days during the period by rockets. The VC/VA second offensive was defeated before objectives could be accomplished.

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AVOB-P (LMB)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, AOB CSRA-65 (H), (U)

and major forces have withdrawn into sanctuaries. An extensive programmed land clearing operation northwest of LBI HML was completed and additional clearing operations continue south of LBI HML as the report period ends.

(2) Force Disposition. (a) At the beginning of this report period, the weight of Division forces was maintained in the southern portion of the FOL (see unit locations, inclosure 12). The 1st Brigade employed one battalion (-) at Song B, one mechanized battalion (-) along Highway 13, a two company Task Force at LBI HML and a two company Task Force at QUIN LBI.

(b) The 2d Brigade employed one infantry battalion in the PHU HUC and LBI THIAU area, one cavalry squadron in the DIL and PHU LOI area, one cavalry troop (OPCO) and one infantry battalion in the PHU LOI area. Headquarters and D Troop, 7-1 Air Cavalry was OPCO to the Brigade.

(c) The 3d Brigade employed one infantry battalion in the vicinity of LBI HML, one battalion in the "rocket belt" west of LBI HML, one battalion in the north LBI SON area and one in the central LBI SON area, and one battalion in LBI DUPT III. A Troop, 7-1 Air Cavalry was OPCO to the Brigade.

(3) Land Clearing Operations. (a) The 1st Engineer Battalion, using organic equipment, began clearing the LBI LOI Base Camp perimeter 24 April and through 9 May 568 acres had been cleared. The 36th Land Clearing Team (LCT) OPCO to the 1st EBN began clearing operations in the vicinity of LBI HML Base Camp on 27 April. The cut around the perimeter was broadened and by 2 May 1447 acres had been cleared.

(b) On 3 May, the 27th Land Clearing Team became OPCO to the Division and both the 36th and 27th LCT's moved to the vicinity of LBI HML (AT 7954) and began clearing operations east and west along the Binh Long-Binh Luong boundary road in an operation called GLTH S-ETH. A 1000 meter wide swath was the cut by home plows through the jungle from the Song B River (AT 8553) to the Michelin Rubber Plantation (AT 6052). The boundary road was upgraded as the clearing operation progressed. A 300 meter cut was then made through the Michelin to the vicinity of DIL HML (AT 5047). Additional cuts were made north and south of the boundary road, into the "rocket belt", the expansive area from which Viet artillery units have launched rocket attacks on LBI HML Base Camp. The 27th LCT participated in Operation GLTH S-ETH on 12 June having cleared 4632 acres. The 36th LCT continued the operation until 26 June clearing 9263 acres. Total acreage cleared was 13,895 acres.

(c) On 7 July the 27th LCT returned to Division OPCO and began clearing operations in the vicinity of LBI HML (AT 8040). The clearing operation continued south generally along Highway 16 which is referred to as the LBI boundary cut. Through 27 July, the 27th LCT had cleared 6064 acres. The 1st Engineer Battalion conducting clearing operations in the same general area since 15 May through 31 July cleared 2719 acres. Further land clearing south of LBI HML continues. See photo runs, inclosure 17.

(4) Operation RO THIAU, Phase I. (a) Contact on 1-2 May was light. However, in 3d Brigade operations, the highly responsive A Troop, 7-1 Air Cavalry with elements of D Troop, 1-4 Cavalry attached, detained one Viet Cong suspect in the vicinity AT 861345 on 2 May. In the same general area, light fire teams engaged and killed three Viet Cong at AT 8553300. At AT 93320 six Viet Cong were engaged one of which was killed. The Viet Cong returned fire on the light fire teams wounding one crew member. Continuing the aerial search, light fire teams destroyed five sampans and detained one suspect on the Song B River in the vicinity of AT 93748.

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AFDB-2 (110)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1966, RGS CSFAR-65 (41), (U)

(4) On 3 May Division forces repositioned along Highway 13 in preparation for land clearing operations in the vicinity of AF B&F LG (AF 7954). In the 2d Brigade Task Force PHU LOI (AF 7615), the 2-2d Infantry conducted reconnaissance in force and night ambush patrols. At 0330 hours, a D Company ambush patrol executed an ambush against an undetermined number of Viet Cong. At first light the area was searched locating nine VC KIA (3C). Two Viet Cong were captured, 4 were four AK47's, one hammock, three ammunition pouches, two US canteen cubs, one poncho liner, one first aid pouch, one US pack and shoulder straps, four US pistol belts, 6 AK47 magazines, one VC poncho, one US hand grenade, one air mattress, 25 pounds of rice and miscellaneous documents. In the 3d Brigade Task Force, night ambush patrols were also active. A Company, 2-16 Infantry, ambush patrols engaged five Viet Cong in the vicinity AF644307 at 1917 hours. Miscellaneous medical supplies and clothing were located. At 2125 hours a second ambush patrol (AF632303) engaged an estimated 20 Viet Cong. In the sporadic contact that continued until 2300 hours, eight Viet Cong were killed and one M16 rifle was captured. There were no US casualties.

(c) The most significant actions during this reporting period took place over the next four days in the 2d Brigade Task Force.

1. The 1-18 Infantry conducted reconnaissance in force and night ambush operations from DI AN Base Camp. D Company on 4 May was tasked to conduct a reconnaissance in force in the vicinity of AF 20105 following intelligence indicating a Viet Cong ammunition cache was located in the area. Departing the DI AN north gate (AF907002) at 0800 hours, D Company moved 1000 meters north along the LSR and then 1500 meters northeast cross country to the HILP. Entering the outskirts of the hamlet, the absence of civilians was immediately noted. Proceeding cautiously, D Company encountered AK47 and RPG fire at 0945 hours in the vicinity of AF919104. An intense fire fight ensued with the platoon leaders becoming initial casualties. Artillery supported in effect, followed in approximately ten minutes by light fire teams. The enemy fire was suppressed, however, attempts by D Company to maneuver provoked additional encounters. The Reconnaissance Platoon on standby at DI AN as a ready reaction force was alerted. With a platoon, 1-4 Cavalry attached, the Reconnaissance Platoon reinforced D Company at approximately 1100 hours, initially securing a PZ (pickup zone) and assisting in extracting casualties. A and B Companies, 1-18 Infantry were alerted at 1000 hours, B Company having returned from a night ambush patrol two hours before and A Company standing down for the annual General Inspection.

2. Determining a sizable enemy force had been encountered, the 2d Brigade diverted available resources to reinforce and support the contact. The 1-4 Cavalry (-) was diverted to the area as was Headquarters and D Troop, 7-1 Air Cavalry. A Company, 1-18 Infantry departed DI AN by foot at 1145 hours. B Company, 1-18 Infantry departed DI AN at 1200 hours by trucks from contact support units. Disorienting on the LSR due west of the contact, B Company moved to reinforce. B Troop (-), 1-4 Cavalry moved into a blocking position north of the contact. A Troop, 1-4 Cavalry with elements of B Troop attached and A Company 1-18 Infantry reinforcing, moved into a blocking position along a road running to the southeast. Light fire teams covered the open rice paddies on the east. B and D Company with the Reconnaissance Platoon attached, then swept to the east. The VC/VN forces dug in on the inside of irrigation ditches, many, shoulder deep in water and others submerged breasting through reeds, were routed. The 1-18 Infantry moved along the outside of the ditches tossing grenades over into the irrigation ditches forcing the VC/VN to abandon their holes. M60 machine gun and M16 rifle fire swept the ditches lengthwise. VC/VN fleeing to the east

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AFJOP-R (PHD)

SUBJ: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RGS CSFOM-15 (M), (U)

were caught in the open by light fire teams and B Troop, 7-1 Air Cavalry which was inserted to the east. Contact was broken at 2045 hours resulting in 260 VC KIA (60) and 5 PW's captured. The following equipment was also captured: 28 AK47's, 10 AK50's, 1 S&S rifle, 1 K54 pistol, 1 US 12 carbine, 3 RPG-7 launchers, 4 RPG-2 launchers, 1 Russian bolt action rifle, 9 land-ollers AK47 ammunition, 1 CZ45 AK V020K-58P, 7 RPG round's and 17 boosters, 3 US 12 hand grenades, 2 VC grenades, 1 60mm mortar sight, medical supplies, 15 loaded AK magazines, 1200 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, 1 62mm mortar tube and tripod and numerous pieces of war gear, sundries, and hammocks.

2. The Viet Cong forces encountered were identified as elements of 21st Battalion, 5th VC Division and 1st Battalion, Dong Nai Regiment apparently on separate missions but relative to the VC/WN second offensive.

(d) Additional action in the 2d Brigade TROK developed before the battle at TROK H&P had ended. The 2-28 Infantry conducted reconnaissance in force and night ambush patrols in the vicinity of PHU LOI Base Camp employing one company during daylight and conducting two company size ambush patrols at night.

1. At 1720 hours, A Company completed an airmobile insertion in the vicinity of KT977218. At 1845 hours while moving northeast toward a built up area established along a north-south trail, A Company made contact with three Viet Cong (KT986222). The area was swept at first light the following morning locating 1 VC KIA (60), 2 AK47's, 2 S&S rifles, 20 sets of new war gear and 5 pair of sandals.

2. At 1815 hours, B Company conducted an airmobile insertion in the vicinity of KT941190 establishing an ambush at KT 937203. At 2125 hours the ambush was executed against 50 to 60 Viet Cong moving southwest through the open rice paddies (approximately 10 kilometers north of TROK H&P). The Viet Cong took cover behind the rice paddy levees and began withdrawing to the northwest into a heavily wooded area west of the rice paddies. Contact was broken at 2205 hours. A sweep of the area located one VC KIA (60).

3. Division redeployed Brigade headquarters and 2-28 Infantry was again with its parent 3d Brigade. This did not affect the battalions operation. The next morning, 5 May, a combat tracker team was attached to the 3d Platoon, B Company. Tracking the Viet Cong force, the tracker dog led the platoon northwest to the southeast corner of a Viet Cong base camp in the vicinity of KT935237. Initial contact was made at 1530 hours. The reconnaissance Platoon and one platoon, L Troop, 3-11 Cavalry moved immediately to reinforce arriving from the northwest at approximately 1900 hours. Attempts to assault the base camp from the north and east were unsuccessful. Tactical air, light fire teams, and artillery supported and an assault was made from the southwest. The short action of these mechanized forces resulted in a successful sweep of the base camp. There were no US casualties. The contact resulted in 51 VC KIA (60) and 4 PW's captured. Two prisoners were from the 22d Artillery Battalion attached to the 21st Infantry Battalion, the 21st having been defeated by the 1-18 Infantry the previous day, and the other two prisoners were from the 1st Rear Services Group which apparently was to link up with the 21st Infantry Battalion and provide logistical support. These two actions interdicted and spoiled the plans for the 5th VC Division's attack on TROK H&P Air Base.

(e) Another devastating contact began 5 May two kilometers south of PHU LOI Base Camp (2d Brigade TROK) in the vicinity of the hamlet KONG LOI (2), KT972134.

1. B Troop, 1-4 Cavalry conducting reconnaissance in force operations

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AVDE-T (14D)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, HCS CSFOR-55 (R1), (U)

in the 1-4 Cavalry .50 made contact with scattered VC/PA outposts as it advanced north along a planned route. At approximately 1305 hours B Troop made heavy contact. Each attempt to advance was met with heavy recoilless rifle, RPG and small arms fire. Light fire tears in support received ground fire from XT870131. Tactical air and artillery were requested and B Troop pulled back. A Troop reinforced B Troop at 1500 hours and after the air and artillery preparation, conducted a coordinated attack on enemy positions. The use of massed armor in conjunction with .50 caliber machine gun fire and cannon fire from the 90mm tank gun suppressed the enemy fire enabling both Troops to penetrate the enemy positions. After penetration, the utilization of flame thrower equipped M4V's and hand grenades resulted in heavy enemy casualties. Aircraft observed small groups of two and three Viet Cong scattering in all directions. Light fire teams engaged the fleeing groups, adding additional heavy casualties. Contact broke at 1550 hours.

2. The following day, 6 May, A Troop with 2d Platoon, B Company, 1-18 Infantry attached, conducted reconnaissance in force in the same area as A Troop, 7-1 Air Cavalry searched from the air. At 1050 hours vicinity of XT868138 light fire teams, 7-1 Air Cavalry engaged eleven Viet Cong. A Troop engaged one Viet Cong at 1110 hours and at 1230 hours vicinity of XT870130 located twelve Viet Cong. Bodies killed the day before. Scattered contacts continued into the afternoon. At 1700 hours, heavy contact was made as the forces assaulted the battle area of the previous day using massed armor. Contact broke at 1530 hours. At 1859 hours, a CS drop was made on the area followed by artillery RPT. US losses were 5 MIA and 21 KIA. Three tanks received minor damage and one tank, moderate damage. Viet Cong losses during the two days were 440 KIA (16). Equipment captured included 2 M4V's, 6 M47's, 1 RPG-2 launcher, 1 60mm mortar, 1 12.7mm heavy machine gun with 300 rounds of ammunition, 1 82mm mortar (lipol) and 6 rounds, 2000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, 5 hand grenades, 25 1/2 pound blocks of petric acid and 2 blasting caps, 1 roll of radio antenna wire and a CHICOM commo horn set, 19 rucksacks, 13 shovels; miscellaneous food items, individual clothing and equipment.

3. Suspecting a vast tunnel complex in the area, elements of the 1-4 Cavalry searched the area throughout the next three days locating tunnels, one a hospital, and the following equipment: 1 82mm mortar tube, 2 base plates, 1 lipol, 52 increments, 60 rounds and 40 fuzes; 1 12.7mm CHICOM heavy machine gun and 650 rounds; 1 .50 caliber heavy machine gun; 1 60mm mortar, 57 rounds, 26 fuzes and 11 propellant charges; 1 DKG 7.62mm light machine gun and 90 rounds of linked ammunition; 1 M14 rifle and 3000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition; 8 M47's and 1000 rounds of AK (7.62mm) ammunition; 1 RPG-7 launcher and 1 RPG booster; 4 RPG-2 launchers and 7 boosters; 31 RPG rounds (unspecified type); 1 75mm recoilless rifle and 1 round; 1 flame thrower LOP 50 (without tank); 34 hand grenades; 1 8 pound AT mine; 14 shaped charges; 27 Bangalore torpedoes; 1 CHICOM field telephone and 24,000 feet of commo wire; 1 camera lens and 5 rolls of 16mm film; 3 CHICOM flashlights; 15 hammocks; 24 pair of sandals; 100 pounds of assorted clothing; 28 entrenching tools; 100 pounds of rice, 24 pounds of other food items, and 3 large cooking pots; miscellaneous medical supplies and 10 pounds of documents.

4. The 165th NVN Regiment was identified as the unit in contact. The Regimental Commander rallied to ARVN forces and stated losses were so heavy that its mission could not be carried out.

(f) On 7 May the 1-2d Infantry, OPCOM to 2d Brigade, conducted reconnaissance in force and night ambush patrols in the L-1 THLU area. The night defensive position was located at XT885031. C Company was conducting

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AMDB-T (180)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1),(U)

ambush patrols from a night operational base west of THU HUC.

(1) A squad from C Company conducting a night ambush site reconnaissance received small arms fire at 1025 hours in the vicinity of XS91992 from an unknown number of Viet Cong. At 1049 hours the patrol became heavily engaged at XS97984. C Company immediately reinforced the patrol and became heavily engaged with an estimated Viet Cong battalion. At 1200 hours B Company and the Reconnaissance Platoon made an airmail insertion north of C Company to reinforce. A Troop, 7-1 Air Cavalry supported. The patrol was extracted at 1400 hours utilizing the artillery and light fire teams to be more effectively utilized. At 1500 hours B and D Company, 2-18 Infantry made an airmail insertion into blocking positions, D Company on the east and B Company on the south. A Troop, 1-4 Cavalry and one platoon, B Troop reinforced along the two major roads bordering the area of contact on the west and south. A Company, 1-28 Infantry was inserted on the west at 1755 hours when B Company, 1-18 Infantry assumed responsibility for the 1-28 Infantry OP. At 1900 hours the infantry elements pulled back into ambush positions covering all avenues of approach into the area of contact. 1-4 Cavalry elements returned to B Company Base Camp. Contact was made with the enemy throughout the night as the VC/PA attempted to break out of the encirclement. Flareships supported. At 0900 hours the following morning A, B, D, 1-28 Infantry made an attack from the north and swept through the area of contact. A thorough sweep of the surrounding area was made with scattered contacts occurring throughout the day of 8 and 9 May.

2. Viet Cong losses were 95 KIA (LC), 2 PW's, 9 small arms and 8 crew served weapons were captured. US losses were 11 KIA and 24 WIA.

(g) On 11 May the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2-28 Infantry and the 3d Platoon L Troop, 3-11 ACR conducted reconnaissance in force in the 3d Brigade Task northwest of PHU LOI. At 1420 hours in the vicinity XT897273 contact was made with an estimated Viet Cong company. At 1758 hours A Company, 2-28 Infantry was air assaulted into the vicinity of XT904279 and moved overland to reinforce. With tactical air, artillery and light fire teams supporting, a coordinated attack was made on the enemy positions. Contact was maintained until approximately 2315 hours. US forces withdrew to XT899-275 until daylight when a sweep was made of the area of contact. Scattered contacts were made commencing at 0900 hours at XT-92272. Contact had broken by 0935 hours. There were 39 WIA KIA (LC). Two PW's, 7 AK47's, 2 M16-2 and 1 M16-7 launchers were captured. One PW was from the Transportation Company 141st AV. Regiment and the second was from the 1st Battalion, 141st. US losses were 2 KIA and 16 WIA. One tank was destroyed when hit by RPG rounds.

(h) The 2-18 Infantry, 2d Brigade, continued extensive reconnaissance in force operations in the RVN HUC area east of Saigon. On 15 May, A Company conducted reconnaissance in force approximately 11 kilometers northeast of the 1-28 Infantry contact on 7-8 May. In the vicinity of XS902990, A Company received small arms and automatic weapons fire at 0910 hours from an estimated 5-6 Viet Cong in bunkers interspersed among buildings of a hamlet. A Troop, 7-1 Air Cavalry light fire teams and artillery supported. The tempo of the battle increased against an unknown size force. At 1725 hours, C Company reinforced A Company and the contact ensued until 1910 hours. Seven AK50 rifles, 2000 rounds of AK ammunition, 3 M16-7 rounds with boosters and 7 M16-2 rounds with boosters were captured. Moving into the area again the following day, C Company captured a wounded Viet Cong, 3 AK47 rifles, 1 Soviet RD 56 7.62 light machine gun and located 32 VC KIA (LC). The PW from the 3d Battalion, 1st Regiment stated the 3d and 4th Battalions were engaged and his unit losses were 100 killed and 30 wounded.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (PHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968, MCS CSF04-65 (R1), (U)

US losses were 10 KIA and 13 MIA. On 18 May an RF/PF platoon from THU DUC District located in the area of contact 5 AK47 rifles, 1 CHICOM light machine gun, 1 60mm mortar, 1 82mm mortar tube and 1 home-made rifle.

(i) B Company, 2-18 Infantry conducting operations southeast of THU DUC 16 May, in the vicinity of AS977962, located and destroyed 20 RPG-2 rounds, 134 CHICOM hand grenades, 13 recoilless rifle rounds, 2 claymores and 1 RPG-7 launcher. Also located and evacuated were 1 RPG-7 launcher, 1 CZ45H 7.65mm pistol and 20 AK47 rifles.

(j) The BIG and OLI continued Operation TUNG THANG, Phase I, through 31 May without significant contact after 15 May. Rapid reconnaissance in force operations in likely enemy sanctuaries, extensive ambush patrols along VC/PAV routes of infiltration/exfiltration, extensive land clearing operations along the Binh Long-Binh Duong Province boundary and key installation security operations in the THU DUC-LAI THAM area continued to adversely affect VC/PAV operations.

1. Of significant note are the 1321 ambush patrols conducted during May of which 73 made contact resulting in 120 VC KIA and 12 PAV's. The ambush patrol losses were 1 US KIA and 19 US MIA. The vital information secured from the PAV's and documents captured were instrumental in conducting successive operations that led to the interdiction of VC/PAV forces and the location of base camps and weapons caches.

2. Operation TUNG THANG, Phase I, was completed 312400 May 1968 with the following accumulative results: US: 118 KIA, 602 MIA (533 evad); 3 MCV's, 1 home plow, 1 (1) ton truck, 1 VTR, 3 tanks, 10 helicopters damaged; 1 eralator, 5 helicopters, 1 ammo carrier, 1 (5) ton truck, 3 (23) ton trucks, 2 tanks, 3 MCV's, 1 home plow destroyed. VC: 1739 KIA (EC), 491 KIA (poss), 40 PAV's, 1 rallier, 893 detainees; 2708 bunkers, 80 sampans, 362 individual weapons, 79 crew served weapons, 405 mortar rounds, 368 RPG rounds, 44380 rounds of SA ammo, 38 M-79 rounds, 1025 grenades, 103 anti-personnel mines, 91 anti-tank mines, 31 bicycles, 97 tons rice, 5 tons salt, 13 tons foodstuffs, 71 122mm rockets, 29 107mm rockets captured/destroyed.

(5) Operation TUNG THANG, Phase II, commenced 010001 June 1968 and continues as this report period ends.

(a) Extensive reconnaissance in force and ambush operations continued to be conducted to hinder resupply and replacement activities and to prevent the possible infiltration of major newly infiltrated units into the III Corps Tactical Zone.

1. On 1 June, 1-16 Infantry OICOM to the 1st Brigade conducted reconnaissance in force, night ambush patrols and land clearing security operations in the vicinity of AT642525. C Company conducted reconnaissance in force and at 1245 hours in the vicinity of AT612546 located an estimated company sized base camp. The following items were located and evacuated: 81 SKS rifles, 3 7.62mm light machine guns, 3 7.62mm Kasser rifles, 6 rifle grenade launchers, 125 rounds of 12.7mm ammunition, 1 PRC 10 radio, 2 CHICOM radios, 1 10 volt generator, 1 CW transmitter (homemade), 1 CW receiver (homemade), 9 assorted batteries, 1 double antenna, 50 rounds of AK ammunition, 2 M79 rounds, 1 plastic gas mask and assorted radio accessories. The following items located were destroyed: 150 rounds TNT, 3 CHICOM rifle grenades, 3 CHICOM fragmentation grenades, 30 kilometers of commo wire, 300 rounds of 12.7 ammunition, 850 rounds of AK ammunition, 1 plastic gas mask, 20 bunkers, 12 assorted batteries and 3 car phones. On the following

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (LHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1), (U)

dry, C Company moved back into the area for further search. At 1251 hours in the vicinity of AT611548 three Viet Cong fired on elements of the company. Artillery supported and the area was swept locating one large bunker which was destroyed. At 1409 hours, two Viet Cong were engaged in a bunker. The Viet Cong returned fire with small arms and one RPG. Three US were wounded and two KIA (EC). An unknown number of Viet Cong withdrew to the north. The following equipment was captured: 1 SKS rifle, 1 COMCOM bolt action rifle, 1 belt of 7.62 ammunition, 4 grenades, 4 RPG's, 6 rifle grenades, 3 concussion grenades, 6 M16-2 rounds, 1 rifle grenade launcher, 3 Viet Cong ponchos, and 1 pound of documents. Destroyed were 6 bunkers (8' x 10') with overhead cover, 1 mess hall with 3 ovens and 6 spider holes.

2. On 3 June, 1-11 Cavalry became OPFOR to the BIG and OCS and moved to FNU LOI Base Camp. Division units began relocating in preparation for the 3d Brigade controlled operation NO DUTY VI in a Viet Cong sanctuary south of FNU VC VI H. The 2-16 Infantry (-) and elements of 1-4 Cavalry established FSPB normally 11 (AT911319) followed by A Battery, 2-33 Artillery on 4 June.

(1) The 3d Brigade commenced operations in NO DUTY VI (see overlay inclosure 18) on 6 June. The 1-11 Cavalry moved overland toward AT 0435. The 2-28 Infantry completed an airborne assault at 0955 hours in the vicinity of AT967351 and established a FSPB followed by C Battery, 1-7 Artillery. The most significant activity took place the first two days.

1. The 1-11 Cavalry moving into the NO made contact with elements of the 165th NVA Regiment which continued sporadically through the day. At 0732 hours vicinity AT875395, a D Troop tank hit a mine causing no casualties. The tank was repaired. At 0852 hours vicinity AT954405, D Troop received one round of RPG fire. Returning fire, the troop continued to move. At 1014 hours D Troop vicinity AT939404 received small arms fire from an unknown number of NVA. A fire fight ensued resulting in 3 NVA KIA (EC) and 3 M16 rounds captured. A Troop made contact with an unknown size force at 1430 hours vicinity AT941404. Small arms and RPG fire was received from the north, east and south. Artillery and light fire teams supported. B Troop reinforced. Contact was broken at 1730 hours. US losses were 2 KIA and 13 NVA. US losses were 9 NVA KIA (EC) and 1 M4, with an M47, was captured from the 3d Battalion 165th NVA Regiment.

2. The 2-28 Infantry made contact with scattered small groups of NVA beginning at 1430 hours in the vicinity of AT9536-AT9735 which continued throughout the afternoon. Two Viet Cong were killed. At 2340 hours, D Company ambush patrol engaged 30-40 Viet Cong in the vicinity of AT959353. Light fire teams, mortars, and artillery supported the contact which continued until 070135 hours. There were no US casualties. There were 4 NVA KIA (EC), 3 M47 rifles, 1 SKS rifle and documents captured. The ambush remained in position and at 0425 hours the ambush was again executed. This time, against a much larger unknown size force. Light fire teams and artillery supported. Light fire teams received .50 caliber or 12.7mm machine gun fire with no damage to aircraft. Contact broke at 0440 hours resulting in no US casualties. One NVA was killed and two individual weapons captured.

3. On 7 June, B Troop, 1-11 Cavalry received an 82mm mortar and ground attack at 0608 hours vicinity AT940403 as the troop prepared to move. An aerial observer, artillery and light fire teams supported. The US were alerted and contact broke at 0633 hours. Counter-mortar fired on suspected mortar locations and a sweep of the site located 16 NVA KIA (EC) and 1 M47 captured. Both A and B Troops continued to have scattered contacts throughout the day in which 4 NVA were killed and 2 M47 rifles, 2 unknown type rifles, 1 60mm mortar round, 1 82mm mortar round, medical supplies

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (PHU)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI), (U)

and documents were captured.

4. On 12 June, AO DUTY VI was renamed AO WOODCO by II FFV and the AO boundary changed slightly (see overlay inclosure 19). On 13 June, 1-28 Infantry completed an airmobile insertion into AO WOODCO, vicinity of YTO15285. B Troop, 1-11 Cavalry secured the landing zone and became OPCON to 1-28 Infantry. C Company, 1-28 Infantry completed an airmobile insertion at the 1-11 Cavalry position, vicinity YTO42360, OPCON to the Squadron.

5. Scattered contacts continued to be made almost daily as base camps varying to regimental size were located. Large amounts of supplies and equipment were located which were evacuated or destroyed. The 11th ACR became OPCON to the Division 12 June and assumed responsibility for AO WOODCO 26 June. The 3d Brigade forces, to include 1-11 Cavalry, disestablished positions and prepared for operations west of LAM KHA Base Camp. The operations in AO WOODCO significantly hampered the VC/VN use of the area as a sanctuary as the statistics through 31 July indicate. AO WOODCO continues.

VC/VNA KIA (BC)	107	Bangalore torpedoes	15
VC/VNA PW	2	Rice (tons)	17.9
Ralliers	2	Salt (lbs)	3630
Small arms	58	Peanuts (lbs)	1500
Crow served weapons	5	Automobile	1
RPG rounds	100	Bicycles	6
Mortar rounds	176	Motor bike	1
Small arms ammo	21112	Medical kits	21
Grenades	1460	Uniforms	50
Lines	121	Sewing machine	1
Line detonators	5	Individual equipment	
Explosives (lbs)	60	Documents (lbs)	35
		Bunkers	569

(c) Throughout June and July, the 2d Brigade maintained the 2-18 Infantry in the THU LUC area. Scattered contacts were encountered throughout the period and weapons caches located as a result of rapid and continuous reconnaissance in force operations which severely hampered VC/VNA efforts to continue pressure on Saigon from the east and northeast. Presented below are the more significant statistical data, including captured or destroyed items, resulting from the Battalion's activities 1-30 June.

VC KIA (BC)	54	82mm mortar rounds	93
VC PW's	4	Grenades	138
Rallier's	1	Mines	10
Individual weapons	46	107mm Rockets	34
Crow served weapons	13	140mm Rocket fuzes	50
Small arms ammunition	9250	Gunnery quadrant, Russian	2
RPG rounds	115	57mm Recoilless rifle, rds	8
RPG boosters	25	75mm Recoilless rifle, rds	9
60mm mortar base plate	1	Bunkers	154
60mm mortar tubes	3	Sumpans	6
60mm mortar tripods	2	Explosives (lbs)	18
60mm mortar rounds	45	VII pinsters	11,500

(d) The 11th ACR, minus one squadron, became OPCON to the BIG RED ONE 12 June. This provided a responsive and maneuverable force that could be readily employed in the generally open terrain between LAM KHA and THU LOI through which VC/VN forces infiltrated/exfiltrated releasing infantry battalions for employment in jungle sanctuaries. The 11th ACR established

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (IHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI), (U)

NO BLCKHOLSA (see inclosure 20) and on 26 June assumed responsibility for NO WOODCO immediately adjacent. The 11th ACo remains in this posture as the reporting period ends.

(e) On 26 June, the 3d Brigade commenced operations in NO FALCA west of LMI KMS Base Camp. (see inclosures 15 and 21). The Infantry battalions conducted airmobile assaults into the area while the 1-11 Cavalry moved overland. The composition of the force on initial disposition follows:

AF533383

1-16 Inf (-)
B/1-11 Cav
C/2-33 Arty (105)

AF621392

1/11 Cav (-)
A/1-16 Inf
How Btry/1/11 Cav (155)

AF573353

2-28 Inf (-)
A/1-28 Inf
A/1-7 Arty (105)

AF649328

D/1/11 Cav
C/2-28 Inf

1. There were no significant contacts with enemy forces during the fifteen day operation, however, significant weapons and food caches were located and intelligence information gained. Significant operational statistical data, which includes captured items evacuated or destroyed, follows:

VC KIA (EC)	14	Rice, lbs	39250
VC PW	1	Milk, quarts	846
Individual weapons	9	Sugar, lbs	1300
Crew served weapons	1	Burns, lbs	1500
SA ammunition, rds	45122	Cooking oil, gal	20
RPG rounds	1028	Pans, lbs	3500
Mortar rounds	48	Salt, lbs	770
Grenades	34	Blasting caps	14
Mines	26	Entrenching tools	19
Bunkers	196	bicycles	14

2. NO FALCA terminated 10 July.

(f) The 1st Brigade conducted an operation in NO FALCA 26 June - 10 July as a follow-up of B-52 strikes (II PFV targets) in the area in which some damage assessments revealed heavy movement in the area after the strikes. The tasked organization employed included the 2-2 Infantry (RECH) (-); C Company, 1-16 Infantry and the 1st Platoon, B Company, 2-34 Armored supported by artillery at FSB Thunder I on Highway 13 (see inclosure 15). No significant contact occurred, however, as in NO FALCA significant quantities of supplies and equipment were captured, a base was destroyed and further intelligence gained. Significant statistical data follows:

VC KIA (EC)	22	Mines	39
VC PW's	2	SA ammunition	3022
Individual weapons	6	Lathe	1
Crew served weapons	1	Motor	1
Grenades	59	75mm RH rounds	14
Mortar rounds	128	Bicycles	1
Bunkers	496	Salt, lbs	1500
Rice, lbs	33875	Mortar tubes	2
		TNT, lbs	600

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-T (RHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RES CSFOR-65 (AI), (U)

(g) On 12 July 1-11 Cavalry moved overland to QUANG LOI, OFCOM to the 1st Brigade, and on 17 July began conducting reconnaissance in force in the LOC NINH area (AU 7810). At 180000 July in the vicinity of XU773-105, C Troop received RPG and small arms fire. A Troop reinforced and in an attempt to flank came in contact. Tactical air, light fire teams and artillery supported. Contact broke at 0930 hours. US casualties were 12 WH. NVA losses were 10 NVA KIA (BC) and 1 NVA captured. The following equipment was also captured: 4 AK47 rifles, 2 S&S rifles, 3 RPG-2 launchers, 10 RPG rounds with boosters, 6 7.92mm machine gun ammo drums, 11 AK magazines, 554 rounds of AK ammunition, 136 rounds of link 7.92 ammunition, 2 7.92 machine guns, 23 CHICOM grenades, 4 anti-tank grenades and 1 pound of documents. At 1020 hours, B Troop in the vicinity of XU780134, three kilometers to the north of C Troop, made contact with an estimated NVA company. Light fire teams and artillery supported. At 1135 hours, B Troop was mortared. The fire fight was intense with the NVA forces utilizing RPG's, small arms and machine guns. The NVA broke contact at 1305 hours and B Troop pursued locating a base camp that had been hastily evacuated in the vicinity of XU803143. US losses were 2 KIA and 15 WH. NVA losses were 29 NVA KIA (BC) and 2 PW's. Captured equipment included 6 AK47 and 10 AK50 rifles, 1 CM and 1 S&S rifles, 1 flare gun, 1 9mm pistol, 3 7.92mm machine guns, 1 60mm mortar base plate, 5 RPG launchers, 2 CHICOM PRC-25 type radios, 30 rounds of 82mm mortar and 21 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, 12 RPG-2 and 3 RPG-7 rounds, 11 RPG boosters, and 13 anti-tank grenades.

(h) The 1st Brigade, following up intelligence gained from the LOC NINH contacts of 16 July, employed additional forces northeast of LOC NINH (see inclosure 16). Division selected targets were struck by B-52's in the area. As the operation continues at the close of this reporting period, base camps with large caches of equipment and rice are being located.

(6) Casualties sustained by the 1st Infantry Division and by VC/NVA forces, including VC/NVA PW's:

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
US KIA	91	64	30	185
US WH	491	383	212	1086
VC KIA (BC)	1274	337	282	1893
VC PW	42	28	16	86

(7) During this report period B-52 strikes have increased in the BIG RED OML EAOI as 70 BIG RED OML selected targets and 38 II FFV selected targets have been struck. These strikes have caused tremendous destruction to base camps. These strikes are being followed up with ground operations and there are indications that this conjunctive effort has forced some major units into or near the Cambodian border.

d. (U) Training. During the reporting period the training posture of the division remained excellent.

(1) Replacement Training: The Division continues to operate five replacement training centers. Each center utilizes the same POI, which in turn conforms to USARV Reg 350-1. The following number of personnel were trained during the reporting period.

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>
1st Bde	329	286	299	914
2d Bde	346	307	426	1061

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (1 HD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFolk-65 (H1), (U)

3d Bde	597	304	402	1303
Div Arty	161	213	130	504
Spt Comd	<u>201</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>155</u>	<u>447</u>
TOTAL	1634	1201	1414	4249

(2) Mobile Training Team: Traveling to various field locations throughout the division area, the mobile training team trained twenty-five rifle companies, one artillery battery, and a composite group from the attached Combat Intelligence Battalion for a total of 1045 personnel trained during the reporting period.

(3) New Equipment Training Team (NETT): During the period, twenty personnel associated with handling and firing of the XM-429 fuse for the 2.75 inch rocket and the XM-229 rocket warhead received training relative to use of the munitions from the XM-429/XM-229, 1st COI, New Equipment Training Team.

(4) KAC-Q Numerical Code System Classes: Classes on the use of the KAC-Q numeral code were conducted 5-29 July. During this period a total of 807 individuals received instruction. Below is a division break down of the people receiving the KAC-Q numeral code system instruction:

1st Bde	494
2d Bde	52
3d Bde	151
Div Arty	59
Spt Comd	<u>51</u>
TOTAL	807

(5) Reciprocal Mobile Training Team: The division is presently involved in a reciprocal training agreement with the RVN 5th Infantry Division. Under present terms of the agreement, 5th ARVN Division provides two NCOs to instruct in the Division Kit Carson Scout Program. In reciprocation, this division furnishes two NCOs instructors for the 5th Division Training Center. During the period, the Kit Carson Scout Program and the National Training Center graduated 66 and 1170 personnel, respectively.

(6) ARVN Battalion Refresher Training: This division is responsible for conducting a one month refresher training program for the twelve ARVN Infantry Battalions stationed within the Division TAOI. Due to tactical necessity, only one battalion may be trained per month. Two Battalions were trained during the reporting period.

(7) TDY Schools in and out of Vietnam: Schools and number of personnel attending are listed below:

AAMTAP Course	36
AH-IG NETT Course	20
DS Maint Course	5
Executive ADP Orientation Course	1
Jungle Survival	11
RECONDO	37

e. (C) Intelligence

(1) Enemy Order of Battle

(a) The total estimated strength of the enemy military units operating

CONFIDENTIAL

7-2-7 (10)

AND CT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RGS CORP-35 (R1), (U)

in the 1st Division Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) is approximately 18,800 personnel. This figure represents a combat strength of about 14,000 personnel, with an additional 4,800 personnel providing logistical support. A minimum figure for infiltration into III CTZ is known to be about 26,000 personnel since TLT, 1968. This is a figure indicating at least 4300 personnel per month infiltrating into the III CTZ area. The known rates of infiltration in retrospect appear to have been adequate to maintain strength in III CTZ and to increase enemy strength in the 1st Division TAOI. At present, known infiltration into III CTZ was at least 6,700 men during May, 200 men in June and 400 in July, 68. Exact current figures for infiltration into the 1st Infantry TAOI are not known.

(b) Specific reinforcements available from outside the Division TAOI are from the 9th VC Division, the 5th VC Division, the 101st NV. Regiment the 38th NV. Regiment and the 273C and Cu Chi VC Regiments. All units within the Division TAOI can be expected to have artillery units in support.

(c) The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units within the Division TAOI and along its periphery are:

UNIT	STRENGTH	COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS	CURRENT PROB LOC
<u>7TH NV. DIVISION</u>	6000	FCE	Loc Ninh Area
HQ & Spt Units	500	N/A	Loc Ninh Area
13th Arty Bn	UNK	UNK	Loc Ninh Area
141st NV. Regt	1500	FCE	Loc Ninh Area
145th NV. Regt	1500	FCE	Loc Ninh Area
32nd NV. Regt	2000	FCE	Loc Ninh Area
<u>SEP. R. T. REGIMENTS</u>			
Dong Hai Regt	1200	FCE	Binh My Area
Song Be Regt	600	FCE	Bo Duc District
Thu Duc Regt	400	FCE	Vic NS 9594
33rd NV. Regt	2000	FCE	Loc Ninh Area
<u>69TH VC ARTY GRD</u>			
34th Arty Regt	1000	CE	Vic KS 9791
208th Arty Regt	650	UNK	Elms vic XT 7808
K33 Arty Bn	350	CE	Vic XT660438
K34 Arty Bn	600	CL	Vic YT281051
52 Arty Bn	400	CL	Vic Filhol
<u>LOC L FORCE UNITS</u>			
C61 Ben Cat Co	80	CL	XT 7725
C62 Chau Thanh Co	65	CE	XT772213
C63 Lai Thieu Co	30	FCE	XT888119
C64 Dou Tieng Co	100	CL	XT525556
C65 Phu Cuong City Flt	30	CL	XT 7929
K127	30	FCE	YT 1182
C127 Co	70	CL	YU 0900
D186 Bn	200	FCE	YU 1715
C275	50	CL	YU 1005
K10 Co	40	FCE	YT 1875
K11 Co	60	CE	YU 2510
K14 Co	100	CE	YU 3520
K16 Co	60	CL	XU 9815
K17 Co	50	CE	YT 0590
K18 Co	30	FCE	YU 4210

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MND)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RES CSFOR-65 (RI), (U)

K19	70	CE	YU 4003
C300 Dong Nai Co	46	ICE	AT 9021
C301 Phu Giao Co	80	CE	XT914365
C302 Tan Uyen Plt	35	CE	XT 9224
C303 Co	70	CE	XT905433
D1 An Plt	30	CE	AT 9709
C65 Loc Ninh-Flt	40	CE	AU630050
C55 An Loc Plt	40	CE	AT830570
C45 Chon Thanh Plt	30	CE	XT693680
C271 Co	70	CE	YU 0900
C70	130	UHK	XT790950
C71	UHK	UHK	YU120050

ADMINISTRATIVE

SERVICE UNITS

1st Rear Service Gp	1800	N/A	HQ vic YT 2555
3rd Rear Service Gp	1165	N/A	Sul-Region 1 & 5
5th Rear Service Gp	430	N/A	HQ vic XU 8716
8th Rear Service Gp	1400	N/A	HQ vic YU 2042

(d) Main Force Combat Units within the 1st Infantry Division TAOI.

(a) 7th RVN Division: The 7th RVN Division consists of the 141st, 165th and 32nd RVN Regiments. The elements of this division dropped out of contact after the May Offensive and were not located by contact again until 18 July, when 1/11th ACH contacted the 32nd RVN Regiment vicinity AU03143. In addition to providing the first indication of the 32nd Regiment's subordination to the 7th Division, this contact led to identification of the division north and northeast of Loc Ninh. The 7th RVN Division has not been located as far north as it currently appears to be since 27 October - 3 November 1967, when it combined forces with elements of the 9th VC Division for the attack on LOC BINH.

1. 165th RVN Regiment: The 165th RVN Regiment set up its base camp in the BINH MY area (AT 9033) in mid-April, remaining in this area until early May. Phan Viet Dung, former CO of the 165th Regiment who rallied on 7 May, stated that the responsibility of the regiment for the May Offensive was the area from south PHU CUONG City to north LAI THINH with the following missions: Destroy at least one battalion and two companies of the enemy's (allied force (main target was the 5th ARVN Division). Support local forces in destroying all the RVN RD Towns and help them create new government agencies, with the main areas being at SON, LAI THINH, and BINH MY. Be prepared to enter the 1st Precinct of S. IGAD when ordered. In late April the regiment moved southward out of its base camp in the BINH MY area to the vicinity of the PHU VAN Training School (AT 8413) where it was contacted by U. S. and ARVN forces, losing over 500 men as a result of the battle. Since the regiment suffered an extraordinary amount of losses in this contact it withdrew to its base camp in the BINH MY area to regroup.

2. 141st RVN Regiment: The 141st RVN Regiment established a Base Camp in the BINH MY area in mid-March, remaining in the area until early May. According to Phan, the mission of the 141st Regiment during the May Offensive was to operate as a reserve element of the division. In the initial phase it would intercept ARVN and allied replacements from BINH MY to BINH CHUAN. Then, it would prepare to replace the 165th Regiment in the LAI PHU District area if the 165th Regiment entered Saigon or withdrew to BINH MY. On 13 May the 1st TF at XT937290 received two well coordinated ground attacks by the 141st Regiment which suffered 67 KIA. On 28 May elements of the 141st and 165th Regiments joined forces and attacked the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RGS RSPON-65 (RI), (U)

Australian FSB Correl at AT933333. Results were 47 enemy KIA and 7 PWs. Ballistics and documents confirmed the location of the 141st and 165th Regiments in the BIEH MI area during June. After the May Offensive the 165th Regiment did a good job of evacuating the dead and wounded, while the 141st reportedly did a poor job.

3. 32nd NVA Regiment: On 10 July the 11th ACR made contact with an enemy force at XU803143 which was later identified as the 32nd NVA Regiment, formerly subordinate to the 1st NVA Division, II CTZ. Documents captured after the contact include a directive reassigning the 320th Regiment (AKA 32nd) from the 1st NVA Division to Group 706 (AKA 7th NVA Division). The 32nd Regiment had recently come from KONTUM Province, II CTZ, where it had been out of contact for approximately 90 days. On 26 July, 1st Lieutenant Pham Luc (NVA) of KTL hospital rallied to the LOC BIEH MISSION POLICE. Pham has been assigned the mission of inspecting all elements of the 7th NVA Division. He stated that the 7th Division left the BIEH MI area on 2 July, arriving in LOC BIEH District on 20 July. Pham gave the present locations of the 7th NVA Division Headquarters, 141st, 165th and 32nd NVA Regiments as XU 8019, XU 7815 respectively. Pham also confirmed the fact that the 32nd Regiment is now subordinate to the 7th NVA Division. He stated that the Division is at full strength; however, he has no knowledge of the division's mission except to resupply, retrain, and receive replacements.

(C) 5th VC Division: During the 2nd Offensive the 5th VC Division is believed to have performed a supporting role for the main force regiments tasked against Saigon. There were only two major contacts within the Division TAOI in which elements of the 5th VC Division were identified.

1. 21st Battalion: On 4 May, vic AT919104, 1-18th Infantry and 7-1 Air Cavalry made contact with enemy units resulting in 260 VC KIA and 5 PWs. Study of captured documents and interrogation of PWs revealed that elements of the 21st Independent Bn, 5th VC Division had come to Tan Hiep Village on 4 May to rendezvous with 20-30 local VC. At the same time, same place, elements of the Dong Hoi Regiment were possibly linking up with an U/I enemy unit. The 21st Bn, which may have been a recon element of a larger element of the 5th VC Division, and a Sapper Unit of COSVN attempted to continue their mission despite losses. The 21st Bn probably had to link up with the 1st Rear Services Group for necessary logistic support in an upcoming attack on the Bien Hoa Air Base. On 5 May, vic AT937237, 2-28th Inf and 3-11 ACR contacted elements of the 1st Rear Services Group and elements of the 22nd Artillery Bn (OFCO to the 21st Bn). The results of this action were 61 VC KIA and 4 PWs. This action interrupted logistical support required by the 21st Bn (and possibly a larger VC attack force) and was the final blow that destroyed the planned attack by the VC Division against Bien Hoa.

2. 274th VC Regiment: On 14 May, vic AS942924, the 5th Marine Bn captured a PW from the artillery element, 1st Bn, 274 Regt. He stated that his mission was to provide artillery support for the 4th LF Bn which was operating in the Saigon area. However, it is believed that the bulk of the 274th Regiment was located east of the Division TAOI. Two PWs captured on 27 May, vic AT553271, following a contact by 3-43 ACR, 18th Division, identified the 2nd Bn, 274 Regiment as a new infiltration group. This new infiltration group took the place of the former 2nd Bn which was now operating in the Thu Duc area as part of the 1st Regiment, Sub-Region 4. The last contact in which elements of the 274th Regiment were identified was on 22 June via AT502352 with 3-43 ACR. Results of the contact were 76 VC KIA and 1 PW. The PW identified the 3rd Bn, 274th Regiment. However, it is believed that the 274th Regiment is still operating in the vicinity

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (PHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RSC CSF04-65 (R), (U)

of Binh Quan (YT 5637) where it may be regrouping and resupplying. There exists the possibility that the 1st Bn, 274th Regiment may be located in the Thu Duc area. A PW captured on 4 July, vic AS990926, by A/2-18 claimed to be a commo-liaison soldier from the 1st Bn, 4th Regt (274th Regt), 5th VC Division. He stated that his unit was located near Saigon.

2. 275th VC Regiment: During the time period of 1 May to 31 July, only one contact was made with elements of the 275th Regiment within our T.O.I. On 3 May, vic AT937194, B/2-28 made contact with an enemy force resulting in 9 VC KIA and 2 PWs. One of the PWs was identified as a member of the 2nd Co, 2nd Bn, 275th Regt. Sometime during the month of May, the 275th Regiment relocated from Southern War Zone "D" to the Boi Loi Woods area where on 22 May vic AF533290 a contact was made in which the 275th Regiment was identified by documents. Contacts and documents captured since that time indicate that they continue to operate in the area primarily protecting supply lines and performing harassing missions on allied outposts and installations.

(c) Dong Nai Regiment: During the month of April the Dong Nai Regiment underwent reorganization in anticipation of its mission in the upcoming Offensive. The regiment was upgraded by strengthening it with replacements from newly arrived infiltration groups and by incorporating the 3rd Local Force Bn which became the K3 Battalion of the regiment, replacing the Phu Loi Bn which in turn became the K4 Bn. Approximately 1 May the Dong Nai Regiment moved out of its base areas in southern War Zone "D" enroute to the Saigon area. On 4 May elements of the Regiment, along with the 21st Independent Bn, were identified in contact with 1/18th, 1st Division vic AT919104. The results of this contact were 260 VC KIA and 5 PWs. Two of the PWs were identified as members of the Dong Nai Regiment. The regiment continued on its way to Saigon where on 5 May the K1 Bn made contact with ARVN Marines vic of the Binh Loi Bridge, AS71971. The results of this contact were 54 VC KIA and 5 PWs. The same date, vic AS921946, 2nd ARVN Air Bn captured a PW in the vicinity of a bridge that had been blown. The PW was identified as a member of the 1st Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. Also on the 5th, an estimated enemy battalion attacked the Phan Tan Gien Bridge, vic AS63933. ARVN Marines reacted killing 72 VC KIA and capturing a PW. The attacking unit was identified as the 3rd Local Force Bn and the C20 Signal Co., Dong Nai Regiment. Following the contact the K3 (3rd LF Bn) withdrew to the Hiep Binh area where on 7 May, vic AS891992, C/1-28/1st Division was attacked by an estimated reinforced battalion. The results of this contact were 41 VC KIA (EC) and 66 VC KIA (Poss). A PW captured the following day, vic AS890993, stated that his unit had been in contact the previous day. The PW was from the 3rd LF Bn. The PW also stated that the K1 Bn was in the area. In Sinh, CO of Sub-Region 5, stated that the K2 Bn was also involved. Following this contact the K2 Bn evacuated the wounded to an area north of An Uyen District. On 9 May, vic AS9900, A/1-28 located 2 VC KIA. A short time later 5 VC were engaged resulting in 5 VC KIA. Documents identified elements of the Dong Nai Regiment. On 7 May vic AS89990, B/1-28 engaged 5 VC. A short time later artillery was fired into the area where more VC were sighted. A sweep of the area the following day located 17 VC KIA. Documents identified a medical section of Binh Duong Province and the 2nd Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. On 11 May, C/1-28 reinforced by A/1-28 made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 31 VC KIA vic AT 70023. Documents found in the area the following day identified the C1 and D4 Companies of the Phu Loi Bn and the Lk Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. Elements of the 1st ARVN Cav captured a PW on 14 May vic AT864114 who was identified as a medic with the K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regt. The PW stated that the K2 Bn had departed War Zone "D" on the evening of 13 May and had arrived in the area the morning of 14 May. 4-9 ARVN on 15

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (NHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period ending
31 July 1968, HCS CSFOR-65 (A1), (U)

May, vic AT870034, made contact with an estimated VC platoon resulting in 1 VC KIA. Documents identified the KIA as a member of the D800 Bn (K1, Dong Hai Regt). On 16 May vic AT870130, 749th Regional Forces captured a PW from the K3 Bn, Dong Hai Regiment. The PW allegedly stated that his unit was moving from Bien Hoa to the Saigon area. 17 May, a rallier from the Transportation group, Dong Hai Regiment turned himself in vic AT854075. The PW stated that he was a member of a 100 man group from the Dong Hai Regiment who were moving south to Lai Thieu, guided by 663 LF Co. On 19 May, vic AT854034, 3/8, 5th ARVN captured 4 PWs during a sweep operation. Three were guerrillas and one was from the Transportation Unit, K5 Bn, Dong Hai Regt. The PW stated that the K1, K3 and K5 Bns along with an U/I LF Company, were to attack the Binh Loi Bridge on the night of 20 May 68. 1/8th, 5th ARVN, vic AS855926 captured a PW on 18 May. The PW stated he was from Phu Loi II (possibly K2 Bn, Dong Hai Regt). The Dong Hai Regiment resumed the offensive on Saigon on 20 May when the K1 Bn crossed the Saigon river and opened the way to Ben Hai strategic hamlet. The battalion suffered heavy casualties in contact with ARVN soldiers. The 1st Company of the K1 Bn was in charge of taking the wounded soldiers back in the rear. The K3 and K4 Bns of the Dong Hai Regiment crossed the Saigon river north of Binh Li Bridge on the night of 24 May. They proceeded through Ben Hai Hamlet toward the Cong Thi intersection, Bien Hoa, where they were stopped. The K2 Bn didn't cross the river until 30 May. The Bn then proceeded to the area north of Ben Cat Canal where it was stopped. When an airstrike was directed on the Dong Hai Regiment Hqs in the Lap Thanh Pk area on 4 June, all communications with the K3 and K4 Bns were lost. As a result the K3 and K4 Bns withdrew from the area on the night of 7 June via the Ben Hai Hamlet area. K4 had a strength of 35 men and K3 had only 20. All but four of these were wounded to some degree. During this time period several small contacts were made with elements of the Dong Hai Regiment within the Division FAL. On 30 May, vic AT877046, 4/8th ARVN located a large weapons and medical supply cache and captured 3 VC PWs. One PW was identified as a company commander in the Dong Hai Regiment. On 29 May, vic AT870043, an estimated VC squad engaged 4/8th ARVN resulting in 4 VC KIA and documents captured. A sweep of the area the following day located 15 more VC bodies. The documents identified elements of the Dong Hai Regiment. 4/8th ARVN, vic AT85046, captured a VC PW from the rear service elements of the Dong Hai Regiment on 2 June. The same date, 3/5-12, 199th Rde made contact with an unknown number of VC vic AT034323 resulting in 14 VC KIA. The following day, 2 more VC bodies and 1 VC PW wounded in the previous day's contact were found. The PW stated that he was from the K2 Bn, Dong Hai Regiment and that he and 100 others were on their way from a hospital to rejoin their unit. On 4 June, vic AT866017, 9/2-18 captured a PW from the 2nd Co, 4th Bn, Dong Hai Regiment. The PW stated that he and sixty others had left the Binh Ly area approx 3 days ago for the purpose of joining the rest of the battalion in the Saigon area. The PW was separated from the rest of the sixty man group when they were hit by artillery. A rallier from the K5 Independent Rear Services Bn rallied vic AT 8514 on 3 June. He stated that the K1, K2 and K3 Bns of the Dong Hai Regiment had picked up rice vic AT874127 on the 7th of June. He also stated that the K4 Bn had come through Binh Nam vic AT865081 moving north the night of 7 June. A PW captured on 9 June, vic AT935030, stated he was the Deputy Commander of the Dong Hai Regiment. He further stated that the headquarters of the Dong Hai Regiment was located vic AT856028, AT857023, AT858030 and AT860025. On 10 June, vic AT891063, the Lai Thieu Intelligence Platoon conducted a search operation resulting in 2 VC captured. One of the PWs was identified as a recon-platoon leader of the K4 Bn, Dong Hai Regiment. On 12 June, and asst platoon leader of the K4 Bn, Dong Hai Regiment rallied in Thu Duc District. The rallier stated that the K1, K3 and K4 Bns of the Dong Hai Regt planned to cross the Saigon river vic AT 8701 and move to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

VDB-T (HHD)

SUBJ: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RGS CSFOR-65 (H), (U)

Binh Ly on the night of 12 June. The K2 Bn had been ordered to entrench in Gia Dinh Province and attack an unknown target in the near future. The same date, vic KS 71912, B/1-26 made contact with an unknown number of VC resulting in 1 VC KIA and 2 PWs. One PW, who later died, stated that his mission was to direct the units of the Dong Nai Regiment going to Saigon. C/1-18 AF engaged 6-8 VC vic XT864076 resulting in 2 VC KIA on 14 June. Documents identified the KIA as members of the K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. One document disclosed the strength of the K2 Bn as of 22 May as 419 with 232 present for duty. Sometime between 9-14 June, the K2 Bn recrossed the Saigon River vic AT 8601 to attack Saigon (possibly the K2 Bn was to reinforce elements of the Tuyet Thang Regt). One PW stated that on 14 June contact was made with the 1st VC Bn and the K2 suffered many casualties. Following the contact, some of the men were told to defend positions in place while others withdrew east of the Saigon River to Highway 13 to the North. On 15 June, 3rd VN Bn made contact with elements of D2 vic AT871002 resulting in 86 VC KIA and 4 PWs. Following the contact it is believed that the rest of the battalion recrossed the river. On 15 June vic AT852088, D/1-18 engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 2 VC KIA and 4 PWs. The PWs were identified as members of C24 Transportation Company, Dong Nai Regt. One PW stated that they had carried approx 100 wounded VC to the Thuan Giao area. On 17 June, vic XT875085, C/1-18 AF conducted an ambush resulting in 6 VC KIA. Documents possibly identified the K2 Bn. The same date, vic AT865015, 1/26 captured a PW in the vicinity of a contact the previous day which had resulted in 30 VC KIA. The PW identified as a member of the 7th Co, K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. He also stated that he had been a member of the 270 Infiltration Group which had arrived in Phuoc Long Province approx 3 weeks prior to his capture. Also on 17 June vic AT 83089, A/1-4 engaged an enemy force resulting in 11 VC KIA. Documents identified the C6 and C7 Companies, K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. Finally on 17 June, vic AT89079, A/1-4 made contact with an enemy force resulting in 7 VC KIA and 2 PWs. One of the PWs was identified as the XO of the 5th Company, K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regt. On 18 June, three ralliers from the Dong Nai Regiment rallied at different locations. One VC who turned himself in to C/2-16 vic AT 8233, stated he was from the C5 Company, K4 Bn, Dong Nai Regt. He located his battalion approx 34 hours walk east of Binh Ly. Another VC who rallied vic AT 8113 stated he was from the 2nd Company, K1 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. He further stated that he believed his battalion was located vic AT859235. Finally a member of the C6 Company, K2 Bn rallied to A/1-18 vic AT873088. The rallier was able to provide details of the route from Binh Whom to Binh Ly used to carry wounded VC. On 19 June, vic XT893012, the RF-FF Company of Thu Duc captured 9 PWs. One PW was identified as the Chief of Staff of the Advanced CP of subregion 1. He stated that his mission was to take two platoons of replacements to assist the 1st and 2nd Bns of the Tuyet Thang Regt in Gia Dinh. The other PWs were identified as members of the Lk Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. On 24 June, vic AT883399, an ARVN OP received a rallier from the Phu Lai I Bn (K4 Bn, Dong Nai Regt). The rallier stated that his unit had been located northwest of Phu Giao when it had been hit by a B52 strike resulting in 15-20 KIA and many wounded. The unit had then moved southwest of Phuoc Vinh. The rallier further stated that at the time of his rally he believed his battalion to be located vic AT925387. 1/6th ARVN captured 4 VC who were hiding in a hole vic AT859125 on June 25. The PWs were identified as members of the K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regt. These PWs were probably stragglers from the K2 Bn. It is believed that by this time all of the battalions of the Dong Nai Regiment had withdrawn to base areas in the Catcher's Mitt to regroup, resupply and receive replacements following heavy losses suffered in the Saigon area. On 5 July, vic AT919337, B/2-16 AF engaged 4 VC resulting in 4 VC KIA. Documents identified the Rear Service Group supporting the Dong Nai Regiment. On 23 July, vic AT919340, an AF

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-T (FHB)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RGS CSFCA-65 (R1), (U)

of the 2-16 engaged 3 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA. Documents identified the 1st Bn, Dong Hai Regt. A/1-16 captured an NVA PW on 21 July in a large base camp, vic AT956351. The PW stated that he was a member of a 300 man infiltration group which was to join the Dong Hai Regiment. On 25 July, vic AT925336, an NVA from 2-16th captured a PW believed wounded in the contact on 23 July. The PW stated that the Regiment was probably located in company size base camps in the Suoi Oi area (AT 9736). The PW further stated that the Regiment was undergoing regrouping and retraining and that a new mission was to be announced soon. The PW also stated that the Regiment had heavy weapons buried between the Binh Loi bridge (AS 9797) and Binh Nham Village (AT 8306). On 27 July, 1-28 and elements of 1/9 ARVN engaged 6 VC while conducting a seal of Binh Chau Village (AT 85145) resulting in 5 VC KIA and 1 PW. The PW was identified as a member of the KI Bn, Dong Hai Regiment. The PW stated that one of the KIA was the CO of the C22 Recon Company, Dong Hai Regt (documents substantiate this). The PW also stated that the KI Bn was located in the Ba Da Secret Zone and that his company was located vic YTO62355 where it was regrouping and retraining.

(d) 1st Regiment, Su-4 (Thu Duc Regiment): During the 2nd Offensive the newly organized 1st Regiment of Sub-Region 4 was assigned the mission of attacking the Newport Bridge and the 9th Precinct of Saigon. Recently captured documents reveal the battles in which the 1st Regt took part during the May Offensive. On 4 May, D2 (2nd Bn, 274th Regt) attacked An Phu Post and D4 (4th Local Force Bn) attacked the Newport Bridge (XS 93-942). ARVN Marines reacted and documents state that losses were 17 KIA and 31 WIA. On 7 May D4 overran Van An Post (unk location) but lost many weapons and had to leave its WIA on the battlefield. The results of this attack was 2 VC KIA and 5 WIA. On 11 May, the 4th Local Force Bn reinforced by the artillery element of the Regt attacked the Newport Bridge again. D4 succeeded in destroying part of the bridge but D2, which was to intercept FALA/RVNLF reinforcements, withdrew from the ambush sites without orders from higher headquarters and lost the opportunity to attack the FALA/RVNLF convoys. The results of this attack were 3 KIA and 7 WIA. On 13 May, the 1st Regt performed counter FALA/RVNLF operations, with D4 operations in Binh Trung (AS940925) and the D2 Bn operating in Thanh Ly Loi (XS 9392). Combat coordination between D2 and D4 was poor and when liaison with the Regimental HQ was discontinued, various elements fought in disorder. While documents only mentioned 27 VC KIA, 13 WIA and 1 PW, 5th ARVN Marines claim 67 VC KIA and 3 PWs. 14 May D4 attacked the Binh Khanh Post, a Special Action Unit attacked the Ong Tranh Post and D2 attacked Phuoc Long Village (AS 9597). D4 overran Binh Khanh Post but failed to capture any enemy weapons. D2 failed to accomplish its mission and lost 2 KIA and sustained 3 WIA. On 3 June, vic AS 9392, a rallier turned himself in. The rallier stated that the 4th Local Force Bn with a strength of 100 men was located vic AS98 954, B/2-16 and ambushed an unknown number of VC moving west resulting in 5 VC KIA. Documents identified the KIA as members of the 82mm Mortar Company, 274 Regt (possibly acting as a support of the 1st Regt). From 10 to 15 June the 1st Regt withdrew for reconsolidation. On 15 June vic XS994944, D/2-16 engaged 3-4 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA. A notebook identified the 2nd Company, 4th Local Forces Bn. On 19 June, vic Y3029986, a US Navy FEA element captured a PW from Group 84. The PW stated that elements of Group 84 were on their way to Thu Duc to reinforce the D2 Bn, 04 Regt (D2, 1st Regt). On 28 June, a Chieu Hoi rallier vic XS943986. The rallier was identified as a member of the 4th LF Bn. On 1 July, vic AS 9296, a rallier from the 2nd Co, 4th LF Bn turned himself in to the Phuoc Long ARF. He stated that the 1st and 2nd Co's of the 4th Bn with a total strength of 60 men were dispersed along two canals: Huoi Huan AS954945 and Dat Set AS964946. The rallier further stated that the 2 Co's were to attack Thanh An OI (AS936926). Also on 1 July, vic

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (1HD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968, LRS CSFON-65 (nd), (U)

AS980946, D/2-18 LF engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA. Documents identified the KIA as a member of the 4th LF Bn. The documents also outlined plans for Subregion 4 for the months of July, August and September to include an attack on Saigon and Hwy 315. On 5 July, vic AS922000, a Chieu Hoi rallier to the Thu Duc Hqs. The rallier stated he was from the 1st Co, 4th Local Force Bn. Lu Van Idi, asst plt ltr of the 2nd Plt, 2nd Co, 4th Bn, 1st Regt rallied to 2-18 LFB on 8 July. The rallier stated that his company had attacked a bridge about 15-16 days ago vic AS 8994 on Hwy 316. He further stated that his company coordinated with another U/I company. As a result of this attack 75 men of his company were either KIA or WL. On 17 July, vic AS933931, A/2-18 engaged and captured 1 VC. The VC was identified as Lu Hooe Diop, AO of the 4th LF Bn. Diop stated that his battalion had suffered many casualties as a result of a contact at Long Xuan (XS 9995) approx six weeks prior to his capture. He further said that on 1 June, he had received instructions to prepare for the 3rd Offensive. Documents captured 21 July, vic YS042930, by a Navy Seal Team provided additional information on Diop's instructions; and additionally furnished considerable background information on the 1st VC Regiment. Information in the documents indicated that the regiment had been instructed to prepare for the Third Offensive between 15 June and 30 July, and that all preparations were to be completed on 5 August. The documents also indicated that the 1st Regiment was to direct its efforts against Saigon's 9th Precinct & Newport Bridge. An unclassified report found among the documents indicated that the regiment itself had been formed on 26 April 1968 from two understrength battalions, four Combat Support companies, one special action platoon, one district local company and various small HQ elements. The regiment was given an AO which encompassed the Thu Duc District and the 9th Precinct (old Phu Thien District). They do not appear to have diviated from this AO since their activation.

(c) Artillery Units: Enemy artillery units have been identified only occasionally in the T.OI during the period 1 May - 30 July. The second offensive which took place in early May was characterized by frequent rocket and mortar attacks. The number of attacks decreased sharply in June and the attacks became sporadic in July. Allied operations and a shortage of ammunition was probably responsible for this decrease.

1. 208th Rocket Regiment: There is considerable evidence to indicate that the 3d Battalion, 208th Rocket Regiment operated within the T.OI during a period. On 22 June a contact vic AF23049 resulted in six murders concluding the CO of the 7th Co, 3rd Bn, 208th Rocket Regiment being killed. On 23 June a PW stated that the CO of the 208th, Nghiep, was killed and that the PW was wounded in an airstrike in Binh My vic XT 9033. On 24 June a PW captured vic XT 4500 indicated that the 3/208th was assigned to the 2730 Regiment for hit-and-run attacks in the Northern area of Saigon. On 24 June ARVN Forces captured a PW who identified his unit as the 2/208th. The PW stated his unit has just crossed the Saigon River in the last few days and that the 1st and 2nd battalions were ONCON to the 9th VC Division and the 3/208th ONCON to SH-1. On 2 July a PW said subregion 5 was reinforced by a rocket battalion belonging to 2208. He stated their targets were THU TOL, DI K and Saigon. On 20 July a PW captured from the 3/208 stated the 7th Co. was LAC vic XT75084, the three companies planned to meet at XT640054. Their intentions were to rocket Saigon, but failed because of Allied Operations and loss of a Rocket Cache vic XT-02070.

2. 96th Arty Regiment: There has been a tentative identification of a new Artillery Regiment subordinate to the 69th Artillery Command. The unit's designation is the 96th Artillery Regiment; the regiment is

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-T (NHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, MCS CSFOA-65 (d), (U)

probably composed of the 52nd Bn, K33 and K34 are two Arty Bns that infiltrated from II CTZ in late 1967, and were formerly subordinate to K3 Front in II Corps. The 52nd was dropped as a unit directly subordinate to the 69th Artillery Command, and documents have linked the 52nd Arty Bn and the 96th Artillery Regiment. The K33 and K34 are two additional units from II Corps and since there haven't been reports of another regimental size Arty Unit it is assumed that they are subordinate to the 96th. The 52nd was located in the Filhol vic AF544 221 on 29 May 68. Documents captured from the 52nd indicate they now have 107mm rockets. A firing table for 107mm rockets captured at the same time indicates the 52nd was probably responsible for the 27 May attacks on Cu Chi. K33 was identified by captured documents on 30 April 68 west of Lai Khe. K34 was identified east of Saigon on 3 May 68. Documents on 31 May 68 indicate the K34 has moved west of Lai Khe.

2. 84 A Arty Regiment: The 84 A Artillery Regiment, or its subordinates were identified only twice during the period. An undated letter was captured 2 July 68, vic IS 0391 probably written by the CO of 2/84A. The writer states the problems he is having securing and maintaining supplies of rockets. On 4 July a PW from 2/84A was captured. X9976916 the PW gave the location of a rocket cache vic X9969917 by a collapsed bridge. The area was searched and the cache was discovered and evacuated. The PW stated the mission was to fire 107mm rockets at the Phu Duc Officers Training Center and 122mm rockets at the Presidential Palace.

(f) Song Be Regiment: On 5 May 68 the Song Be Regt conducted an attack by fire on Bo Duc with a ground attack by the 211th and 212th Bns. Attacks by fire were also made on Phuoc Long, An Loc and many other installations in MR 10. Many of the local force companies aided in these attacks by fire and ground attacks. The regt has not been in contact since 5 May 68, but have probably been involved in harassing fires used to cover up for troops and supply infiltration past US/MARV installations.

(5) Local Force Units:

(a) During the reporting period, local force units supported main force units by acting as guides, recovering objectives, and replacing supplies. Local force units have also been used to screen the movements of supplies and troops by harassing fire. In the Second General Offensive local force battalions were used as the lead element during the attacks on the Saigon area, as in the TLT Offensive. The local force battalions which participated in the 2nd General Offensive, however, had been reorganized into regimental-sized units to improve the enemy's command and control.

(b) The enemy local force units in III CTZ have undergone a radical reorganization since TLT. The old local force battalions have disappeared and in their place new regimental-level units have been formed, in or near the Division T.O.L.

SONG BE REGIMENT:

211th MF Bn
212th MF Bn
7th 82mm Mortar Co
8th 75mm Art Co

NGUYEN THANG ON 273C REGIMENT:

1st MF Bn
2nd LF Bn
3rd LF Bn (went to Dong Hoi Regt in early April)

CONFIDENTIAL

WDB-T (NHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-45 (d), (U)

4th Gia Dinh Support Bn

THU DUC OF 1ST REGIMENT OF BR 4:

2nd Bn, 274 Regt

4th LF Bn

C3 and C5 Cos, 5th Div

(c) During the last reporting period, local force companies appeared to be attempting to form into battalion-sized units by upgrading themselves. On the whole this appears as a failure. Only two LF companies have become multi-company units, but they have remained basically the same sized units as before.

(d) It was noticed that several of the local force companies have changed their AOs slightly in the past few months, especially after Tet. It appears that C61 has shifted its AO somewhat eastward toward the Linh Ky area. This change may have occurred to facilitate the infiltration and possibly the movement of supplies. A commo-liaison person stated he had taken 20-100 man infiltration groups from the Linh Ky area to the Lai Khe area, possibly to the Trapezoid or Long Nguyen Secret Zone. While C61 may or may not act as commo-liaison, they would probably act as security guard for the movement of infiltration groups. C62 and C63 have also seemed to have generally stayed closer to the Saigon River area in the past months, this may be to facilitate the movement of troops and supplies on route into the Saigon area. Throughout this area, there are more people, which would call for more activity in proselyting and collecting supplies, etc.

(6) THE MAY OFFENSIVE:

(a) The May Offensive, or the second offensive occurred during the period covered by this report. The May Offensive began with a series of coordinated attacks on 30 April and 1 May during which enemy forces harassed RF/FF outposts and attacked RVN installations at Ben Cat and Trang Bang. On 2 May, the pattern was repeated at Duc Hoa, and on 3 May a RF/FF was attacked with mortar fire six kilometers west of Tan Son Nhut Air Base. During the night of 3-4 May, Tay Ninh City received an attack by fire. These actions were probably designed to screen enemy troop movements toward Saigon, and the enemy completed his redeployment of troops forward assembly areas by 3 May. During the period 5-11 May, the enemy attempted to complete the deployment of troops around Saigon; and to conduct another offensive into the city. However, allied operation prevented the successful accomplishment of this mission. After it became evident that the enemy could not enter Saigon in force, he resorted to infiltration in small groups in order to continue disrupting friendly activity in the Capital. While several platoon-sized groups did succeed in entering Precinct 6, they were unable to link up and conduct coordinated operations.

(b) 1st Infantry Division units fought two sharp battles with enemy units on the periphery of the Capital Military District during the May Offensive. On 5 and 6 May, elements of the 1-4 Cav contacted the 165th RVN Regiment southeast of Phu Loi (vic AR 60135 and 62126) and killed 440 VC/NVA. As a result, the 165th Regiment withdrew from the C&D area in survival status. On 7-8 May, C/1-28 engaged the K3 Battalion, Dong Nai Regiment west of Thu Duc (vic AS 91992) killed 65 enemy. As a result of this contact, the regiment moved to position north of Lai Thieu. In the middle of May enemy units which had been a part of the May Offensive against Saigon moved into "close in" base areas in the vicinity of the Capital. Units remained in these areas and attempted to maintain pressure on the Saigon area throughout May and the first part of June. Some attempt was

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (HND)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, ACS CSFOR-15 (M), (U)

made during this period to move again against Saigon, but these attacks were uncoordinated and ineffective. By the end of June, units had moved out of the Saigon area. The regimental-sized units which had remained near Saigon since early May (Dong Nai, 8th, 101st, Thu Duc, and 273C Regiments) had suffered significant casualties during the period.

(7) Character of the enemy threat: The enemy appears to be making preparation for renewed offensive operations. The number of enemy forces in and around the 1st Division T.O.I is as it has ever been in the past, and the quantity and quality of equipment available exceeds that of previous periods. During the hours of darkness the enemy can move on foot with almost complete freedom in more than 80% of the area of the T.O.I. Because of effective camouflage, heavy jungle or rubber tree canopy, and with his ability to pass his troops as civilians, the enemy is able to move relatively in many areas of the T.O.I during the day. No operations to deny the enemy foodstuffs have succeeded for more than a short period of time due to the numerous sources of food available to enemy procurement agencies. In short, as long as new enemy personnel continue to be committed to the III CTZ there are no obstacles which make it impossible for the enemy to equip, feed, train, move and deploy his units. There are no physical reasons why the enemy cannot launch offensive operations against almost any target in the T.O.I. The decision to or not to engage in major combat lies almost entirely with the enemy. However, his probability of military success in any type of major combat is very low. The recent loss of valuable cadre probably makes the enemy less combat effective, man for man, at this time than he has been in past years. While future attacks may occur at separate locations on a coordinated basis, Saigon remains the most lucrative target for propaganda purposes. Indications are that the enemy believes that his political and psychological goals would be furthered by a new series of offensive operations. It also appears that the enemy believes that in order to achieve the maximum effect from these offensive operations they must be launched during the period spanning the National Party Conventions and the Presidential election in the United States. It is likely that these attacks will be launched simultaneously at several targets in the CTZ with the seizure or penetration of Saigon and the CHD as their ultimate goal.

(8) See inclosure 23, an assessment of the NVN/VC posture from 1 August 1967 to 1 August 1968.

f. Logistics:

(1) During this reporting period, 63 resupply convoys were conducted between DI AN and LAI KHA totaling 170,220 vehicle miles. Convoy vehicles totaled 5,674 for an average of 68 vehicles per convoy. Thirty resupply convoys were conducted between DI AN and QUAN LOI averaging 98 vehicles per convoy and 203,904 vehicle convoy miles.

(2) US Air Force airlift support to division base camps and forward areas, was increased over the previous reporting period due to tactical operations being conducted out of two airlocked forward areas, LOC NINH and SONG BO. Support rendered by aircraft type was: C-130, 106 sorties; C-123, 144 sorties; C-7A, 1,896 sorties. Transported were 30,712 passengers and 2,599,065 lbs of cargo.

(3) The 1st S&T Bn continues to support division operations from DI AN with forward support platoons at THU LOI, LAI KHA and QUAN LOI. A semi-permanent aircraft refueling facility was completed at LAI KHA Base Camp on 27 July equipped with a 350 gallon per minute fuel pump which de-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period ending
31 July 1968, MCS CSPOR-65 (R1), (U)

creases refueling time significantly.

(4) The 701st Maint Bn continues support at division base camps. Permanent contact teams from Headquarters and A Company were located at PHU LOI and LAM KHS, the latter was operational on 17 June. Special contact teams and technical assistance teams are dispatched on a daily basis and as required by organic and attached units.

.g. (U) Organization:

(1) Major reorganization took place within the 1st Infantry Division during the May, June, July reporting period. On 7 June MTOs 7-175T, Infantry Battalion, was implemented. Basic organization included Headquarters and Headquarters Company consisting of 15 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 144 enlisted men, four rifle companies consisting of 6 officers and 150 enlisted men each and a combat support company consisting of 4 officers and 96 enlisted men. The 1st Infantry Division has continued to attach the 4.2 inch mortar platoons to the artillery battalions organic to the division. This concept has proven it's worth. By supplementing the artillery, it is felt that better use is being made of the 4.2 inch mortars. Normally, four mortar platoons are employed in base camps and the remainder utilized in fire support and patrol bases throughout the division tactical area of interest. The tactical situation in Vietnam warrants consideration of placing the 4.2 inch mortars at brigade level.

(2) During June, the 105mm towed artillery battalions underwent the change over to the 6-1550 series MTOs. The rank structure and equipment levels have generally proven adequate to meet the needs of the units. The 155/8 inch battalion underwent the change to MTOs 6-355 in July. Generally, this was considered an improvement over the Echo series TOW with the exception of the loss of 12 cargo carriers, K-548. The cargo carrier is much better suited to the terrain and conditions found in Vietnam than are wheeled vehicles, particularly for carrying ammunition. Another major item, which the artillery unit commander considers necessary for safe operation of the howitzer, is the control group M/GM 39, which is employed at each gun. Telephones authorized for this purpose are not only wasteful in manpower but lend themselves to errors when giving firing commands. An increase in M/GM 39 should be considered when drafting TOWs in the future making provision for one at each howitzer section.

(3) At present the 1st Infantry Division is operating without a tank battalion. The terrain here in III Corps tactical zone lends itself to the use of armor. The tanks found in the tank company attached to the division and those found in the organic armored cavalry squadron are proving to be of great value. Because of the jungle and the heavy mines found in many areas of the tactical area of interest, a medium to heavy tank is considered far superior to newer armored vehicles such as the Sheridan. The M-48 tank has proven very successful in this area.

(4) During April the Combat Intelligence Battalion (Provisional) was organized with an authorized strength of 55 officers, 10 warrant officers, and 353 enlisted men. The mission of this battalion is to provide command and control, management and dissemination of all available information and intelligence obtained or developed in support of the division. To provide Battlefield Information Center/Battlefield Information Control Center (BIC/BICC) support to the division, to provide administrative and logistical support to subordinate and attached elements, and to train assigned and/or attached elements.

(5) The battalion is presently undergoing testing, which began in July, to test the feasibility of this type of an organization.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (11), (U)

h. (U) Psychological Operations:

(1) Psychological operations this quarter were aimed at three prime target groups:

- (a) Civilians
- (b) VC soldiers and their relatives
- (c) NVN soldiers

(2) During the quarter 20,477,100 leaflets were dropped and 816 hours and 15 minutes of loudspeaker broadcasts, 310 hours and 10 minutes ground operations, were employed in support of the division. The following is a breakdown, by unit, of these support operations.

UNIT	LEAFLETS	BROADCAST TIME
1st Brigade	5,407,000	117 hours 20 minutes
2d Brigade	6,860,100	542 hours 5 minutes (301 hours 10 minutes ground operations)
3d Brigade	8,210,000	156 hours 40 minutes
TOTAL:	20,477,100	816 hours 15 minutes

i. Civic Action/Civil Affairs:

(1) Command emphasis has been placed on US/Vietnamese relationships. MACV Command Information Office has recently published fact sheets on Vietnamese attitudes and customs, which are distributed for reading. Military papers have emphasized civic action projects.

(a) The 1st Division PIO has given maximum coverage to civic action. In July the Division had twelve civic action articles in newspapers, primarily the 1st Division Traveler.

(b) Some of these articles should have been more informative. For instance, one article was boastful of the marvelous deeds of a Division unit which contributed supplies to the Vietnamese. The article should have been expanded to include the Vietnamese efforts and initiative in the project.

(2) The opening and securing of the highways in the Division TAOI contributed to the pacification effort. Yet the opening of roads has also brought about its problems, such as traffic incidents resulting in increasing deaths and injuries to pedestrians. The ACoFS, G5 has emphasized the need for safety in newspaper articles and in the monthly CA/ SYOP Newsletter. In a cooperative venture the G5 and G3 Sections have produced brochures, posters and billboards to emphasize to the need for traffic safety and good US/Vietnamese relations.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Classification, Assignment and Utilization of Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: The number of replacements received during the quarter did not equal all types of losses (AFS, rotation, reassignment and

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1), (U)

casualties) and the total enlisted strength of the command has gradually decreased.

(1) EVALUATION: The enlisted strength decrease can be attributed to the strength ceiling of 101.1% of authorized. It has become increasingly evident that personnel required in excess of authorized to perform headquarters and base camp functions must be at the expense of combat and combat support battalions, which has resulted in a gradual decrease in "foxhole strength".

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A strength ceiling of 103% of authorized should be instituted.

(2) Power Generator Repairmen:

(a) OBSERVATION: An insufficient number of trained power generator repairmen (MOS 52D) were available to the 701st Maintenance Battalion.

(b) EVALUATION: The 29-15a TOE provides for seven power generator repairmen and one assistant. Five of these men are assigned to the main support company and one is assigned to each of the forward support companies. The CONUS school trained generator repairmen are fully qualified to troubleshoot and repair all military standard generators and have the training in generator theory required for repair of non-standard equipment. As a result of a shortage of power generator repairmen, the Battalion was required to use powermen (MOS 52B20) in these slots. Powermen are only trained on the 1.5, 3, 5 and 10KW generators, and do not have the necessary background to troubleshoot and repair the electrical system in motor-generators.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Additional school trained power generator repairmen be provided to fill the spaces presently authorized, and that one more MOS 52D be authorized in each forward support company, due to the high density of generators in Vietnam.

(3) Field Strength:

(a) OBSERVATION: Consolidation of administrative and logistical functions greatly increases the percentage of personnel present for duty in forward areas.

(b) EVALUATION: During the reporting period, the average field strength of the organic battalions remained around 80% of the present for duty strength. This substantiated the study made in Jan 68 which indicated that certain administrative and logistical functions at battalion level could be consolidated and released more personnel for field duty.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Whenever possible, administrative and logistical functions should be consolidated under a central controlling section.

B. Operations.

(1) RON positions versus NDF:

(a) OBSERVATION: During this period battalions made use of successive RON positions instead of the better fortified but more permanent NDF.

(b) EVALUATION: RON positions allow for greater mobility and flexibility and better coverage of an AO. They obviate the need for extensive logistical support and free larger forces for offensive operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In areas where large enemy troop movements or concentrations are not anticipated and where tactical surprise and mobility are desired, RON positions should be used.

(2) Employment of Air Cavalry:

(a) OBSERVATIONS: During this period, the brigades employed attached Air Cavalry for immediate exploitation of intelligence information and as a screening force rather than for miscellaneous quick reaction missions, RRF, or intelligence gathering.

(b) EVALUATION: Air Rifle Platoons and Air Cavalry produced excellent results when assigned an aggressive, highly mobile role in support of, or in conjunction with, the overall Brigade operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That Air Cavalry special capabilities be exploited in offensive roles.

(3) Operations of VC Local Force Units:

(a) OBSERVATION: Local Force VC units main activities have been in preparing to assist main force units for the next offensive by collecting taxes, food, information, reconning for overnight way stations, and guiding main force units through the area. They have also recruited local villagers as laborers for carrying supplies and maintaining supply caches.

(b) EVALUATION: Increased seal and search operations have hampered local force activities. This causes the main force units increased hardships in attempting to sustain themselves in combat in populated areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Emphasis on village seal should be maintained in an effort to eliminate popular support of main force units.

(4) Air-mobile towers for Night Defensive Positions:

(a) OBSERVATION: The range of the small radar installations at the night defensive positions of the division are limited by many factors. Some of these are due to their position at ground level. They are shielded by armored vehicles and small terrain irregularities.

(b) EVALUATION: A small tower with sufficient height to clear surrounding vehicles, bunkers and defensive positions was provided. Design incorporated such considerations as rapid mobility for ease of transporting the tower, and stability for a ground surveillance radar in addition to an observer. Units employing these towers express satisfaction and have found it necessary to move them as NDP positions change. See sketch attached to Inclosure 9.

(5) Engineer support for river search operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: In current river search operations in the vicinity of Saigon, it is necessary for the boats to penetrate the nepa palm without being damaged.

(b) EVALUATION: The pneumatic assault boat proved unsatisfactory for this purpose. It could not be maneuvered rapidly when the boats were attached and after each operation, a great deal of time was required to patch and inflate the pneumatic boats. The light tactical raft half-section was used and has proved to be satisfactory. The aluminum bow can penetrate the

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

nepa palm without being damaged and the boats require a minimum of maintenance. The 25-horsepower outboard motors are utilized by providing marginal speed when the boats are loaded and are attacked from the shoreline. Within the stress limits of the transom, a larger motor should be used to provide greater maneuverability under fire.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: An outboard motor in the 40- to 50-horsepower range should be provided to power the light tactical raft half section. Requisition action has been initiated by the 1st Engineer Bn.

(6) Preparation for Movement:

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of Engineer mine-sweep teams and mine detectors in advance of convoy movement is essential.

(b) EVALUATION: By positioning mine-sweep parties along the route of march in pairs, the teams can sweep from a central point in two directions and open the route in half the time it would take if only one party was used. Mines are located by the detectors and by alert and experienced engineers who notice irregularities or disturbances in the roadway. Mines so located are blown in place, saving personnel, equipment and convoy delays. Experience has shown that the mine sweeps should never walk a line from a command mine. These are invariably booby trapped and have resulted in several casualties.

(7) Underground Cable.

(a) OBSERVATION: Underground or buried cabling for division communications at Lai Khe.

(b) EVALUATION: During the enemy's second offensive, the outside plant facilities were again put to a severe test. It was noted that even greater protection and diversification was needed than that provided by diverse routes and multiplicity of cable pairs. As a result, underground cables were installed, and the majority of the division headquarters communications cabling is now underground.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That any cabling for permanent base camp operations be buried for greater protection.

(8) Secure Voice, Ground to Ground.

(a) OBSERVATION: The limited range of the KY-8 secure voice crypto device continued to be a major problem in the ground operations of the CG secure net.

(b) EVALUATION: The KY-8, working with an RT-524, has a range of approximately 40KM. The 1st Bde is located approximately 65KM from division headquarters. Using a normal AB-577 antenna 65 feet high, secure voice can be established with the 1st Bde less than 10% of the time. To overcome this problem, the 121st Signal Battalion has extended the AB-557 to a height of 80 feet which has added a reliability factor of 60% which remains inadequate. The Signal Battalion is now in the process of procuring an AB-216/U micro-wave tower which will provide a height of 120 feet and should allow a reliability factor to the 1st Bde of 90%.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all division base camps located in dense jungle or rubber tree area be augmented with a minimum of four AB-216/U towers. The towers cannot only provide good FM communications, but can

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

be used to extend VHF and UHF communications.

(9) Secure Voice in the Command and Control Ships.

(a) OBSERVATION: The KY-28 has proven to be a compact, rugged and simple to operate piece of secure voice equipment. The method of keying the KY-28 is fast and leaves very little chance of error. Operation of the KY-28 can be learned very quickly due to the simplicity of the operator controls and indicators. However, the maintenance problems encountered with the use of the KY-28 covers a large area.

(b) EVALUATION: The use of the KY-28 decreases the range of the radio. This is due to the requiring of a clear, strong signal for synchronization of the KY-28. At the present time, retransmission of the secure voice is not possible. However, secure voice retransmission capabilities will be available on or about the third quarter of fiscal year 1969 with the issue of the HYL-3, regenerator repeater. The maintenance of the KY-28 may become a problem because of the lack of maintenance personnel and lack of repair parts. The density of cryptographic equipment within the division has increased by 125% in the last three months and will increase another 50% by the last of October. Although the equipment density has more than doubled, the maintenance personnel authorized has remained the same. The increased emphasis on the use of secure voice for the command net requires numerous checks of all ground stations and airborne secure equipment. At the present time, the cryptographic maintenance personnel average working fourteen hours a day and are frequently called out at night. There are not spare KY-28 components available at this time for issue to the 1st Infantry Division DISTRA. This will require the turn-in of all inoperative equipment to the support maintenance facility located at Long Binh. This method is time-consuming and requires a great deal of administrative work. Of the 10 KY-28's in use during the last 20 days, 2 have become inoperative. DISTRA has been notified by the support maintenance facility that necessary repair parts are not available for the KY-28's.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Strong emphasis be placed on augmenting the division TO&E with additional crypto repairmen.

(10) Dial Central Office (DCO):

(a) OBSERVATION: The 1st Infantry Division requires long distance telephone facilities far greater than those now presently existing. The division operates from four main base camps with many units operating from all four locations. The administrative services for the division are presently located in Di An.

(b) EVALUATION: The Army Area Communication System has installed a DCO at the Lai Khe base camp but has placed a 30% Class A restriction on the telephones. Due to this restriction the Danger Main and Danger Support switchboards carry many administrative calls which should go over the Army area switchboards.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a division-wide calling area be installed with no class restriction. The 30% Class A restriction should apply to calls outside of the division area.

c. Training.

(1) Night Training of the Individual Soldier

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(a) OBSERVATION: Continued emphasis should be placed on night training of the individual soldier.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that the individual soldier has not received enough training in the conducting of night operations, e.g., use of stealth when moving at night, selection and positioning of night ambush patrols, land navigation and the effectiveness of noise and light discipline during night operations. It is a proven fact that unsuccessful night operations can be attributed to the preceding comment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: More emphasis should be placed on night training of the individual soldier prior to coming to Vietnam. Fifty percent of Vietnam-oriented training should be concentrated on night operations with emphasis on night movement, night ambush patrols, and light and noise discipline during hours of darkness.

(2) Medical Training for Crewchiefs and Gunners:

(a) OBSERVATION: With the increasing threat of the Third Offensive in the near future, the Aviation Battalion evaluated the level of emergency first aid training among the aircrew members assigned to the organic companies. It was determined that refresher training was necessary to review emergency procedures and the administering of first aid by any crewmembers.

(b) EVALUATION: The importance of first aid and the measures at the disposal of crew members to assist injured personnel on the aircraft cannot be over-emphasized. This training is being conducted by the Battalion Flight Surgeon and will be scheduled as part of the initial orientation of all new crew members as well as conducting training on a continuing basis.

(3) Flight Standardization Program:

(a) OBSERVATION: A review of the high accident rate within the Brigade Aviation Sections was made. This study revealed that replacement aviators were being assigned directly to the brigades after arriving in country and receiving a checkout in the OH-13S helicopter. This policy was immediately changed in that all aviators destined for Brigades would first be assigned to Company B from 45-90 days and perform the less demanding missions until such time as their proficiency had increased to the point they could be considered a safe and accomplished aviator. At the same time, an experienced and school-trained IP was assigned to the S-3 section to monitor and supervise a division standardization program. A definite initial orientation training program has been established and is being adhered to.

(b) EVALUATION: The standardization program and the assignment policy of aviators to the Brigade Aviation Sections has significantly improved the experience level of aviators within the brigades as well as reducing the number of accidents and incidents over the reporting period.

(4) Radio Relay and Carrier Attendants (MOS 31M20):

(a) OBSERVATION: It is the experience of this battalion that the personnel now being received in the MOS 31M20 are not fully trained in two principle areas:

(b) EVALUATION:

1 The personnel now arriving in the battalion in the MOS 31M20 are

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

severely lacking in training in antenna erection and trouble shooting procedures. In some cases, the personnel have only experienced a demonstration of antenna erection and consequently when the time arrives to erect an antenna, they have little or no practical knowledge.

2. The battalion is also experiencing long system and circuit outages due to the inability of the 31M20 personnel to troubleshoot the equipment effectively. At the present time, the 31M20 personnel are troubleshooting the equipment by replacement of components, rather than by symptom. Upon the reestablishment of the system, no one knows what was wrong with the system and the components that were replaced are turned in to maintenance as being inoperative. This adds to the already overloaded maintenance system.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the program of instruction for the 31M20 course be revised to allow more time in the areas of antenna erection and troubleshooting procedures.

d. Intelligence.

(1) Essential Elements of Intelligence.

(a) OBSERVATION: Throughout the performance of normal missions, the aviators of the 1st Aviation Battalion are in position to observe and report information on activities in the Division TAOI. There has been much timely intelligence information passed to collection agencies in the form of spot reports. Conversely there is often a reluctance to report everything observed. Many times the crews take the position that, "surely this has already been reported." Constant instructions and reminders are required to keep the flow of information coming in.

(b) EVALUATION: The importance of timely intelligence cannot be over-emphasized. All aircrews should be briefed prior to each mission on what to look for and how to report what they see. Thorough debriefings are also necessary to establish all pertinent facts and disseminate same.

e. Logistics.

(1) M113 Engines:

(a) OBSERVATION: During a period of about two months, there was an inordinately high rate of failure of M113A1 engines.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the requirement for rapid repair and return of combat vehicles, many M113A1 engine failures were diagnosed incorrectly, and many engine assemblies were replaced unnecessarily. As the supply of engines became low and work requirements slack, more time and effort were expended on diagnostic techniques used to determine why the engines failed. A number of engines were found to have a blower motor drive shaft broken, thereby permitting no air to get to the engine for combustion. The shafts were replaced and the engines became fully operational. It was found that the shaft will break when an engine is accelerated suddenly or turned off while operating at high RPMs.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1. That thorough diagnostic procedures be used whenever an engine is inspected.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

2. That blower motor drive shaft checks be added to the trouble-shooting check list in the M113A1 engine manual (TM 9-2815-205-34P). This check should be made when the engine fails to develop power.

3. That drivers be cautioned about consequences of rapid acceleration or deceleration of the engine.

(2) Generator Administrative Deadlines:

(a) OBSERVATION: Units are denied the use of some deadlined engineer equipment for excessive periods of time.

(b) EVALUATION: Many repair parts for engineer equipment are extremely scarce. Often it is easier to get replacement end items than repair parts. Most equipment requiring field maintenance requires parts to complete the repair. Due to the scarcity of parts, engineer equipment remaining on deadline for 45 days may be turned in for replacement. A DA Form 5-23 must be filled out by the direct support unit and then be forwarded to an administrative headquarters for review and approval. In most cases approval is automatic. The using unit is often required to operate without the equipment for over 50 days, while the supply system is tested for the part and administrative action is taken. The fact that the same part may be required for a number of pieces of deadlined equipment has no effect on the 45-day wash-out criterion. Each item must await parts for 45 days before the DA Form 5-23 can be approved. Only after the item has been turned in may the supported unit request a replacement.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That authority be delegated to the direct support level to determine disposition of all engineer equipment and that discretion be allowed in applying the wash-out criterion.

(3) Field Repair of OH-13S Engine Mount Bracket:

(a) OBSERVATION: An OH-13S helicopter was sent to one aircraft maintenance company with a 15/16 inch long crack at the aft end of the engine mount bracket on the center frame. This would normally require a center frame change.

(b) EVALUATION: After close inspection of the crack and area affected, it was determined that a repair could possibly be made. Weighing the man hours expended during a center frame change and the time the aircraft would be non-mission ready against the possibility of a satisfactory repair made by a highly skilled welder, it was determined that a repair would be attempted. A repair was made by stop-drilling the crack (a small hole was drilled at each end of the crack). The crack was then welded and a reinforcing plate welded over the crack at the aft outside of the bracket. The repair was inspected by a technical inspector and the maintenance officer and found to be satisfactory. A report of the repair was submitted to the Bell Helicopter Company engineers by the local Bell Helicopter Technical Representative. A reply was received stating that Bell Helicopter engineers had concurred with the repair.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That prior to attempting a field expedient repair which is not specifically authorized by appropriate technical manuals, a technical representative be contacted for his concurrence on the proposed repair.

(4) Use of Tech Reps to Increase Aircraft Availability.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(a) OBSERVATION: A $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch long nick approximately one half way through the aft cross tube was found on an AH-1G (Cobra) landing gear. The nick was beyond limits.

(b) EVALUATION: At this time the cross tubes FSN 1620-973-1873 were in short supply in the Republic of Vietnam. According to the technical manual, no repair could be made. The cross tubes are made of 7075T6 riveted repair would result in changing the spring rate and the shock absorbing characteristics; consequently, this was not acceptable. To maintain the aircraft to structural limitations was required. Contact was made with the chief Bell Helicopter Technical Representative, and the AVCOM stress engineer was located in Saigon. It was determined that the aircraft could be flown with this condition but could not be used to practice touchdown autorotations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That technical experts be contacted when critical equipment required repairs for which authority is not granted by the appropriate manuals. These experts are prepared to evaluate problems and authorize field expedient repairs.

(5) Use of Contact Teams to Supplement a Forward Support Maintenance Company.

(a) OBSERVATION: The concentration of units at one Division base camp reached such proportions that it became inefficient to support them from a central maintenance point.

(b) EVALUATION: Maintenance support of the Lai Khe area had been provided by a reinforced forward support company with a strength of 130 men. A study of the situation revealed that a separate contact team in the base camp would increase the efficiency of the maintenance effort while allowing a reduction in the size of the forward support company. The contact team was tailored to support certain divisional and non divisional units in all facets of direct support maintenance except supply. It was decided that the forward support company could provide the repair parts supply activity for the base camp. As a result of the division of responsibilities, the units of the base camp are receiving better maintenance support, performed in a more efficient manner.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That whenever a forward support company is supporting more than an Infantry Brigade and its normal attachments, serious thought be given to establishing a contact team from the headquarters and Main Support Company. Such a contact team should have the same maintenance capability as the forward support company, on a reduced scale.

(6) Ballistic Helmets.

(a) OBSERVATION: Ballistic helmets that were due in-country in late April 68 per USARV AVAHV-LOG have not been received as of the end of the reporting period. The requirements were furnished USARV through DSO. 1st S&T Battalion by letter. Followup action has failed to get these items released.

(b) EVALUATION: It is of prime importance that all personnel be equipped with the proper equipment to perform a given assignment. There has been one case in the Aviation Battalion where a ballistic helmet, if available, might have saved the life of a crew member.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That command action be taken to obtain the ballistic helmets for each aircrew member assigned to the 1st Infantry Division.

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AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(7) Rigging for Aerial Resupply.

(a) OBSERVATION: Rigging operations at NDPs and resupply pads are not up to standards.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to large personnel turnover with Brigade, rigging teams are not properly trained. To overcome inefficiency and avoid waste, losses and accidents, personnel involved in resupply must be trained in rigging procedures.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a continuous "Rigger Training Program" be conducted for all battalions by the 213th Assault Helicopter Company.

f. Organization. None

g. Other.

(1) Night PsyWar Missions.

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of night PsyWar missions to further remove the cover of night from the enemy have proven to be highly effective when targeted against known units on the ground. Such messages when they mention members of the unit by name tend to demoralize all members of the unit.

(b) EVALUATION: Night PsyWar missions have proven to be a highly effective tactical tool. According to Hoi Chanh interviews, such missions tend to demoralize the enemy and lower his will to fight.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that the use of night PsyWar missions be used when units and members of the unit can be positively identified.

(2) Artillery Leaflet Dissemination.

(a) OBSERVATION: Use of artillery leaflet rounds were tested during the quarter. Results of the test indicate that approximately 80-90% of the rounds failed to function.

(b) EVALUATION: The high rate of duds indicates that the present rounds, which are over 15 years old, are inadequate to perform the mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that new artillery leaflet rounds be procured and retested.

(3) Targeting.

(a) OBSERVATION: Feedback from Hoi Chanh interviews and IPW reports indicate that targeting is more effective when directed against known weaknesses of an identified unit.

(b) EVALUATION: The targeting of a leaflet or tape against a known weakness of a unit, and, where possible, mentioning members of the unit by name, lend a credibility to the propaganda thus increasing its overall effectiveness.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that targeting continue on selective rather than general targets.

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AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(4) Coordination Meeting.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Binh Duong Province PsyOps Coordination Committee met twice during the month of July. Members of the committee consisted of representatives of Binh Duong Province, 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 101st Air Mobile Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 5th ARVN Division.

(b) EVALUATION: Meeting of this nature tends to greatly improve the coordination between units, and leads to a better understanding not only between American units, but also between the American and ARVN units operating in the area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that meetings of this nature be encouraged wherever possible.

(5) PSYOPS Broadcasting.

(a) OBSERVATION: Recent innovations in Brigade PSYOPS broadcasting operations have greatly aided the PSYOPS operations of the Brigade.

(b) EVALUATION: These innovations have helped reduce the reaction time for PSYOPS missions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Disseminate the following comments to other S-5s and PSYOPS Detachment Commanders: A new loudspeaker frame with 500-watts output has been designed and tested with outstanding results. The unit is 50% lighter than the old 1,000-watt unit, and can be installed by one man in 10 minutes on a UH-1D or OH-6 aircraft. An operational quick reaction mission has already been flown by an OH-6 Cayuse aircraft. Effectiveness of the message in terms of clarity is essentially the same as the 1,000 watt system. Maximum ceiling flown was 1,500 feet due to cloud formation.

(6) Armed Propaganda Team.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Armed Propaganda Team (13 ex-VC led by two ARVN Polwar Sergeants) remains an unqualified success.

(b) EVALUATION: Face-to-face propaganda to the civilian population continues on a 7-day basis. Intelligence acquisition, a byproduct of their primary mission, has contributed greatly to our intelligence efforts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The use of Armed Propaganda Teams and propaganda movies at rallies and hamlet festivals has been proven effective in reaching captive audiences in a subtle, acceptable manner.

3. (C) Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information.

Cover and Deception. (Techniques as reported in the previous report continue to be utilized.)

FOR THE COMMANDER

22 Incl

- 1 Organizational Structure
- 2 ~~List of Key Commanders~~
Withdrawn, HQ, DA

M. S. Hevzdos
M. S. HEVZDOS
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

-3--1st-Bde-ORLb-----	
-4--2d-Bde-ORLb-----	
5 3d Bde ORLL	
6--Support-Command-ORLb-----	
-7--Division-Chemical-Section-ORLb-----	Withdrawn, HQ, DA
-8--1st-Aviation-Bn-ORLb-----	
9--1st-Engr-Bn-ORLb-----	Withdrawn HQ, DA (Incl Sketch not withdrawn)
-10--1st-Signal-Bn-ORLb-----	
-11--1st-MP-Co-ORLb-----	
-12--Unit-Locations-1-May-1968-----	
-13--Unit-Locations-4-May-1968-----	
-14--Unit-Locations-7-May-1968-----	
-15--Unit-Locations-28-June-1968-----	
-16--Unit-Locations-20-July-1968-----	
-17--Photographs,-Operation-GIANT-SWATH-----	Withdrawn, HQ, DA
-18--Overlay,-AO-DUTY-VI-----	
-19--Overlay,-AO-VOODOO-----	
-20--Overlay,-AO-BLACKHORSE-----	
-21--Overlay,-AO-FENCE-----	
-22--An-Assessment-of-the-NVA/VG-Posture- from-1-August-1967-1-August-1968-----	

DISTRIBUTION:

3 CG, IIFV, ATTN: G-3 Analysis
1 CG, IIFV, ATTN: 7th MHD
3 CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC (DST)
1 CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHCS-MH
2 CINUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT
1 JCMH, DA
4 17th MHD

AVFBC-RE-H

1st Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period 1 May 1968 -
31 July 1968, (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, Hq II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266

SEP 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375


Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPCP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned of the 1st Infantry Division for period ending 31 July 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


O. B. FORRY
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DST (19 Aug 68) 2d Ind (C)

MAJ Klingman/ds/LBN 4433

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1), (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 11 OCT 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning classification, assignment and utilization of personnel, page 27, paragraph 2a(1). This headquarters recognizes the gradual decrease in total enlisted strength. This decrease reflects a change in USAFV strength posture from slightly over authorized strength to slightly under. As the authorized strength of the command approaches the Department of Defense imposed ceiling, stringent efforts are required to prevent the reoccurrence of overstrengths such as experienced in the past. However, this headquarters is presently committed to maintain the combat elements of the command at 103% of authorized strength in MOS 11B and at 100% authorized strength in all other MOS; this results generally in maintaining 101% of overall enlisted strength in the combat units.

b. Reference item concerning engineer support for river search operations, page 29, paragraph 2b(5): Concur. The unit will be cautioned not to notch the ponton transom.

c. Reference item concerning secure voice, ground to ground, page 30, paragraph 2b(8). The unit assessment of the value of the AB-216/U antenna tower, in providing increased reliability in radio communications is valid. Records indicate that the 1st Infantry Division has five towers on hand. The unit will be advised that NTCL action should be initiated to obtain authority for the number of towers required.

d. Reference item concerning secure voice in C&C ships, page 31, paragraph 2b(9). DA was made aware of critical shortages of COMSEC maintenance personnel on 24 June and again on 17 August 1968, at which time this headquarters requested that all outstanding requisitions for these personnel be filled. On 17 September, DA announced that 38 personnel (MOS 31S20) had been assigned against USARV requisitions with arrival dates during September 1968. Upon arrival, these personnel will be assigned to divisions and separate brigades to insure that each division has a minimum of six, and each brigade a minimum of two qualified personnel. In addition,

40

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AVHGC-DST (19 Aug 68) 2d Ind (C)

SUPJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1), (U)

this headquarters has recommended establishment of seven 15-man COMSEC Divisional Contact Detachments (CDCD), one detachment for direct support to each division. CDCD's will be authorized subsequent to the identification of trade-off spaces by this headquarters to DA on or about 15 October 1968.

e. Reference item concerning dial central office (DCO), page 31, paragraph 2b(10). The desirability of intra-division telephone service with no class restrictions is recognized. However, the Division TAOR is larger than the area serviced by the Lai Khe Dial Central Office. It is not technically feasible to extend Class A access outside the area serviced by the dial central office, in order to permit a division-wide calling area with no class restrictions. The limit of 30 percent of subscribers having Class A access is dictated by the design criteria of the Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone System (ATS) which is being installed in Southeast Asia, and will include the Lai Khe Dial Central Office.

f. Reference item concerning night training of the individual soldier, page 31, paragraph 2c(1): Concur with the recommendation that night training should be emphasized during Vietnam oriented training.

g. Reference item concerning radio relay and carrier attendants (MOS 31M20), page 32, paragraph 2c(4):

(1) The US Army Southeastern Signal School (USASESS), Fort Gordon, is the CONARC school responsible for training radio relay attendants and repairmen. The late arrival in Vietnam of trained operator and maintenance personnel in respect to new equipment arrivals is a problem which was brought to the attention of a CONARC Liaison Team during a visit to USARV in April 1968, and to the Commandant, USASESS in correspondence from this headquarters. As a result of the USARV recommendations, changes have been made in the course POI and training on the new AN/GRC-50 and PCM equipment began in July 1968. POR training has been removed from the POI for technical courses, including the radio relay and carrier attendant courses. This has increased the time devoted to trouble shooting and antenna erection.

(2) The USAESS provides the initial technical training with student input limited to those individuals meeting established criteria. This criteria is based on student capabilities required to successfully complete the course, years of training experience, current needs of the Army, and qualifications of enlistees and inductees. The improvement of the technical and leadership capabilities of the individual soldiers remains a command responsibility.

41

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (19 Aug 68) 2d Ind (C)

11 OCT 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI), (U)

h. Reference item concerning M113A1 engines, page 33, paragraph 2e(1): Concur. The new USARV Pamphlet 750-18, now in the final stage of revision, will include a caution on rapid acceleration or deceleration of engines.

i. Reference item concerning ballistic helmets, page 35, paragraph 2e(6): Concur. This headquarters has forwarded to USAMC a request to accelerate procurement of these items.

j. Reference item concerning rigging training, page 36, paragraph 2e(7): Nonconcur. Change 4 to USARV Regulation 350-1, dated 25 July 1968, established a division level helicopter load preparation training program designed to ensure that all units engaged in heliborne operations maintain an appropriate number of personnel trained in the proper techniques of helicopter load preparation.

k. Reference item concerning artillery leaflet dissemination, page 36, paragraph 2g(2): Concur. Serviceable rounds are in the pipeline. USARV Regulation 75-1 directs units to initiate a malfunction report when they encounter a lot of unserviceable ammunition.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


W.C. ARNTZ
Chief of Staff
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ II FFV
HQ 1st Inf Div

42

CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-DT (19 Aug 68) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Inf Div for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

14 NOV 1968


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG



* 8 Infantry battalions and 1 infantry battalion (mechanized)

ASSIGNED UNITS

HHC 1st Inf Div
Co F, 52nd Inf (LRP)
HQ HQ and Bnd Spt Co. d
1st Ad in Co
1st LP Co
701st Maint Bn
1st S&T Bn
121st Sig Bn
1st Engr Bn
1st Avn Bn
1st Med Bn
1st MI Det
50th MI Det
266th CrL Plat
242d CIL Det
43d PI Det
44th PI Det
17th Mil Hist Det
1st Sqdn 4th Cav

HHC 1st Bde
1st Bn 2d Inf
1st Bn 26th Inf
1st Bn 28th Inf
41st Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
HHC 2d Bde
2d Bn 16th Inf
2d Bn 18th Inf
1st Bn 18th Inf
35th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
61st Inf Plat (Combat Tracker)
HHC 3d Bde
2d Bn 2d Inf (MECH)
1st Bn 16th Inf
2d Bn 28th Inf
HH Btry Div Arty
1st Bn 5th Arty
1st Bn 7th Arty
2d Bn 33d Arty
8th Bn 6th Arty
234th FA Det (Radar)

ATTACHED UNITS

340th Avn Det

OPCON UNITS

B Co, 2d 34th Ar. or
D Btry 71st Arty (2 QUAD 50)

A Btry 5th Bn 2d Arty (-)
1st Plat I Btry, 29th Arty
(6 Sect)

Incl 1

44

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3RD BRIGADE AND LAI KHE BASE
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVIB-WB-C

6 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3rd Brigade for Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RCS/CSFCH-65 (R1) (U)

Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVIB-T (NRD)
APO 96345

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. Intelligence: The enemy launched his second offensive in early May. Counter offensive operations conducted in Lam Son against battalion size elements set the enemy back in his efforts to generate momentum in the second phase of the planned attacks on Saigon. The VC and NVA forces suffered heavy losses in the tactical area of operation. Enemy initiated activity and ground contact has declined to such a degree that it is believed he has delayed his ideas of a third offensive for the present, in hope of reorganizing militarily and politically. It is a general consensus that VC/NVA forces probably have gone into a resupply and retraining period in order to reevaluate this present situation. The enemy has avoided contact by not returning fire and chooses instead to flee, which leads us to believe that he has received some instructions prohibiting him from directly engaging Allied Forces.

b. Operations: During the reporting period the Brigade participated in operation Toan Thang. Brigade continued tactical overwatch of Ben Cat, security of Lai Khe Base Camp and secured Phuoc Vinh Base Camp and outlying installations between 23 May and 4 June and again between 13 July and 16 July. During May the Brigade conducted extensive land clearing operations around Lai Khe and in the "Rocket Belt" west and north of Lai Khe while conducting air operations and night ambushes in these areas and in northern Lam Son. After 12 June the focus of operations shifted to the "Catchers Mitt" to the east and later to the "Trap-oid" area in the west. Brigade is now operating along the Song Be north east of Lai Khe and around the Lai Khe area. The only significant single engagement during the reporting period took place on 5 May when Company D, 2-26 Infantry and L Troop, 3-11 ACR engaged an unknown sized VC force at 1535 hours vicinity XT935237 in Lam Son. Air and artillery were employed and contact was broken at 1945 hours. The sweep of the battlefield produced 70 VC KIA (BC), 6 VC PW, 12 M47 rifles, 4 RPG-2 launchers, 7 RPG-7 launchers and 1 M16-1G launcher. A significant find occurred on 5 July in the Trapezoid area when Company B 2-26 Infantry at 1151 hours discovered a cache of 55 107MM rockets, 440 RPG-2 and 522 RPG-7 rls at AT591361.

c. Logistics: The majority of operations during the reporting period were resupplied from Lai Khe Base Camp with a small portion of resupply coming from Phuoc Vinh. The brigade supported a total of 7,400 troops with 16,142 tons of cargo that were moved over HWY 13 and 27 tons that were air lifted to Lai Khe.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) Strength:

(a) Observations: Units must constantly operate at less than authorized strength.

45

Incl 5

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(b) Evaluation: Rifle company field strength is normally reduced by casualties, CIC training, base camp requirements and M&R, especially in the NCO grades.

(c) Recommendation: That personnel be crossed trained to perform several requirements, i.e. rifleman, crew served weapons gunners, MTO's and that all personnel be trained for leadership tasks. Most rifle squads are being led by specialists and SGT, E5. Continued emphasis on NCO training must be stressed at all levels. Commanders must tailor their organizations to meet personnel shortages.

(2) Morale:

(a) Observations: Morale in the field units continues to be high. Morale among base camp units is less than desired.

(b) Evaluation: Field troops have a sense of mission, not normally found among headquarters and support troops. Troops in the field have the satisfaction of accomplishing missions with tangible results, whereas those in the base camps feel that in many cases their primary job is not recognized or essential and that their duties with base camp defense should be accomplished "by someone else".

(c) Recommendation: That a base camp TD be studied where possible and that commanders at all levels make every effort to instill in their personnel the importance of each man fulfilling the units essential and basic mission, to include Base Camp Defense.

b. Operations:

(1) RON positions versus NDP:

(a) Observation: During this period the Brigade has made use of successive RON positions instead of the better fortified but more permanent NDP.

(b) Evaluation: RON positions allow for greater mobility and flexibility and better coverage of an AO. They obviate the need for extensive logistical support and free larger forces for offensive operations.

(c) Recommendation: In areas where large enemy troop movements or concentrations are not anticipated and where tactical surprise and mobility are desired RON positions should be used.

(2) Employment of Air Cavalry:

(a) Observations: During this period the Brigade employed attached Air Cavalry for immediate exploitation of intelligence information and as a screening force rather than for miscellaneous quick reaction missions, M&F, or intelligence gathering.

(b) Evaluation: Air Rifle Platoons and Air Cavalry produced excellent results when assigned an aggressive highly mobile role in support of or in conjunction with the overall Brigade operation.

(c) Recommendations: That Air Cavalry special capabilities be exploited in offensive roles.

(3) Employment of Close Air:

(a) Observation: Whenever contact was established fighters were put in as close as possible to the point of contact on the ground sometimes necessitating pull back of friendly troops. The enemy recognizing this technique would move quickly out of the way sometimes leaving a few individuals in the contact area to screen.

²
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(b) Evaluation: Air strikes put in according to this doctrine usually missed the main body of enemy troops.

(c) Recommendations: The most significant results are obtained when the fighters cover a greater area by starting 200 to 300 meters to the enemy rear. Air support is then walked toward friendly forces covering the flanks as much as possible.

c. Training: NONE

d. Intelligence: BICC

(a) Observation: The new BICC intelligence collection concept employed during the month of July established a new dimension in the field of intelligence.

(b) Evaluation: The BICC concept has greatly increased the intelligence gathering capabilities at battalion and brigade levels.

(c) Recommendation: That the BICC concept be supplied with the necessary communication equipment and visual reconnaissance capabilities to expand upon its present collection process.

e. Logistics: Rigging for aerial resupply.

(a) Observation: Rigging operations at NDP's and resupply pads are not up to standards.

(b) Evaluation: Due to large personnel turn over with Brigade, rigging teams are not properly trained. To overcome inefficiency and avoid waste losses and accidents, personnel involved in resupply must be trained in rigging procedures.

(c) Recommendation: That a continuous "Rigger Training Program" be conducted for all battalions by the 213th Assault Helicopter Company.

f. Organization: NONE

g. Civic Actions:

(1) Vietnamese involvement in civil assistance.

(a) Observation: A GP large tent which was set up at village entrance was willfully torn apart. The tent was installed in May to provide shelter for the people while they were waiting for transportation.

(b) Evaluation: The tent was set up as a temporary measure to protect the people from the elements. Since the villagers themselves were not involved in the project they did not care for it at all.

(c) Recommendation: Projects should be fully coordinated with GVN officials and projects should involve the people as much as possible. All structures in any civic actions project should be of a permanent nature to prevent damage and vandalism.

(2) Following through on civil assistance projects.

(a) Observations: Dental trough was constructed at Lai Khe hospital. This trough is quite elaborate and very well made. However it is not being used and is falling into a state of neglect and disrepair.

47

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(b) Evaluation: This project though quite important, failed because there was a lack of interest by the people and a lack of supervision by the civil affairs party who started this project to see to it that the trough was used properly.

(c) Recommendation: Projects such as the Dental Hygiene trough need constant supervision by trained personnel. Projects should be geared so that the VI officials can eventually take over the program for themselves without US help. Also the project must be within the needs of the people to begin with. If the projects are pushed upon them, no matter how important, they will fail.

3. (C) Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information.

a. Reference: 1ST INF DIV Confidential msg, cite AVIB-T(MHD) 2351, SubJ: Tactical Cover and Deception (U) dated 2 April 1964.

b. Land Clearing Operations:

(1) Observation: These operations by nature are open invitation to VC mines, booby traps, claymores and ambushes.

(2) Evaluation: To make these operations worthwhile vehicle and personnel losses must be held to a minimum by detailed planning.

(3) Recommendation: Cover areas to be plowed and areas to be traveled by vehicles with night ambushes. Sweep out the area with troops and combat vehicles before the start of each day's operations and outpost. Make deceptive cuts at the end of each day but do not cut out a race track for the following day's operations until the following morning.

c. Ambush site occupation and recon.

(1) Observation: Reconnaissance of ambush site is a must but a compromised ambush site is worthless.


(2) Evaluation: Reconnaissance and occupation of ambush site by moving directly into it can be avoided by tactical deception.

(3) Recommendation: Make reconnaissance by moving thru the intended site without stopping to another position, preferably one from which the site can be observed. This operation can be repeated as necessary. Choose a daylight log position which the patrol can occupy after passing the actual ambush site. Move back into ambush position only under cover of twilight or semi-darkness.


EARL C. ACUFF
Col, Inf
Commanding

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AIR-MOBILE TOWER



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Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

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1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		Confidential	
3. REPORT TITLE		2b. GROUP	
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Infantry Division (U)		4	
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)			
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)			
CG, 1st Infantry Division			
3. REPORT DATE		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
undated		51	
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
b. PROJECT NO.		683262	
c. N/A		8c. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.			
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A		OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			

51

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NOV 68

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The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

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ITEM 2

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ITEM 3

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ITEM 4

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ITEM 5

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PAGE # _____

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD # : Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page # : That page on which the item of interest is located.

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